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ABSTRACT 
The Islamic State’s strategic resources are dissolving as fast as they once 
appeared. The fear is that, as the Islamic State deteriorates, it will expand its operations 
outside the region through the use of returning foreign fighters. Evidence suggests that 
Islamic State children are subject to indoctrination and training that give them the tools to 
plan, organize, and execute terrorist attacks. These children also have the motive, means, 
and opportunity to attack the West while in the West. 
This thesis contains both quantitative and qualitative analyses that help assess the 
dangers that Islamic State returning foreign fighter youths pose to the domestic security 
of the United States. Three significant findings emerged out of this work. First, avenues 
exist for youth fighters indoctrinated and socialized by the Islamic State to plan, conduct, 
and execute terrorist operations in the United States. Second, youth fighters of the Islamic 
State share similarities with the child soldiers of other armed groups that influence 
whether they will have the propensity to engage in future terrorist attacks. Lastly, U.S. 
policies are geared toward addressing the humanitarian crisis that emerges out of the use 
of child soldiers, yet we treat the child soldiers of terrorist organizations like criminals. 
These findings have long-lasting implications for U.S. domestic security. 
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The Islamic State has sent young children to their deaths on the battlefield and in 
suicide attacks. For the most part, the carnage inflicted by these youth terrorist fighters 
has been contained to the areas where the Islamic State has held territory. Fortunately, 
this phenomenon has not yet manifested in fatalities in the United States. However, a 
threat from IS youth fighters approaches on the horizon. 
This thesis challenges the notion that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the 
children of the Islamic State to travel to the United States from Syria or Iraq to carry out 
organized terrorist attacks on American soil. Adults and children from foreign lands have 
fought on behalf of the Islamic State, and recent reports indicate that the Islamic State is 
increasing its use of children to conduct attacks.1 The Islamic State’s strategic 
resources—land, money, and fighters—are dissolving as fast as they once appeared. The 
fear is that as the Islamic State deteriorates, it will attempt to expand its operations 
outside the region through the use of returning foreign fighters (RFFs). As the Islamic 
State continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria and more foreign fighters of all ages 
return to countries around the world, nations must understand the complexity of the 
situation.  
Evidence suggests that children of the Islamic State are subject to Islamic 
extremism indoctrination and training that give them the tools to plan, organize, and 
execute an attack. The research in this thesis reveals that the Islamic State’s child soldiers 
have the motive and means to attack the West while in the West, but not all possess the 
opportunity to leave the region. This thesis demonstrates how the RFF phenomenon is a 
carrier that could deliver dangerous Islamic State children to the United States and other 
Western countries. 
This thesis contains both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative 
analysis is important because the number of Islamic State foreign fighters has been 
1 Mia Bloom, John Horgan, and Charlie Winter, “Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic 
State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015–2016,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 2 (February 2016): 29–32. 
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identified by policy analysts as a potential indicator of future attacks in the West. 
However, it is hard to define the RFF threat based on quantitative data alone because 
governments may be overestimating or underestimating the numbers. The main thrust of 
this thesis is a comparative analysis of government policies intended to counter returning 
foreign fighters. Three countries with Western-style governments—Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and France—were studied to examine how they are coping with the issue of 
returning foreign fighter youth. The overarching counterterrorism policies of the 
countries were coded and classified and were analyzed on a spectrum ranging from 
“hard” to “soft,” in which hard policies are punitive measures, and soft policies involve 
the adoption of social programs. The policies addressing youth foreign fighters were also 
analyzed on a spectrum. 
Three significant findings of this study emerged from this work. First, avenues 
exist for youth fighters indoctrinated and socialized by the Islamic State to plan, conduct, 
and execute terrorist operations in the United States. Second, youth fighters of the Islamic 
State share similarities with the child soldiers of other armed groups that influence 
whether they will have the propensity to engage in future terrorist attacks. Lastly, U.S. 
policies are geared toward addressing the humanitarian crisis that emerges out of the use 
of child soldiers, yet we treat the child soldiers of terrorist organizations like criminals. 
Each of these findings has repercussions for U.S. domestic security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the Islamic State released a video showcasing the story of Yusuf, a ten-
year-old American boy who traveled to join the Islamic State with his mother when he 
was only eight years old.1 His closely cropped hair, big brown eyes, and flaring ears―not 
to mention the space between his two front teeth―hint at the pre-adolescent innocence 
shared by many children his age. However, Yusuf is different. Instead of ballfields and 
parks, he plays on deserted playgrounds and fields of destruction piled high with debris 
from the Syrian insurgency. He speaks English with smatterings of Arabic dialogue 
dispersed throughout his manifesto as an Islamic chant wails in the background. Standing 
in front of a building razed by war, Yusuf stares into the camera as if in a trance-induced 
state and addresses the U.S. president directly:  
Allah promises us victory, and he has promised you defeat. This battle is 
not going to end in Raqqa or Mosul. It is going to end in your lands. By 
the will of Allah, we will have victory. So get ready for the fighting has 
just begun.2  
The final scenes show Yusuf and his seven-year-old best friend from Sinjar Province 
preparing a sniper perch and taking instruction from a black-clad Islamic State insurgent. 
Yusuf lifts the stock of a U.S. government-issued M-16 rifle to his shoulder and stares 
down a Zeiss scope mounted on top of the receiver. The video concludes as he clicks the 
fire selector switch from “safe” to “semi-automatic.” 
If his story is true, then Yusuf and his family are a few of the estimated 250 
people who have left the United States for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.3 The 
Islamic State has recruited, indoctrinated, and used children as young as four years old to 
                                                 
1 Aaron Y. Zelin, “New Video Message from the Islamic State: ‘The Fertile Nation #4—Wilāyat Al-
Raqqah,’” Jihadology (blog), August 23, 2017, http://jihadology.net/2017/08/23/new-video-message-from-
the-islamic-state-the-fertile-nation-4-wilayat-al-raqqah/. 
2 Zelin. 
3 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” The 
Soufan Group, December 2015, 10, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_Foreign 
FightersUpdate3.pdf. 
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further its agenda, and this scene captures the looming threat they pose.4 Adopting 
similar techniques as rebel groups in Africa and Asia, the Islamic State has sent young 
children to their deaths on the battlefield and in suicide attacks. For the most part, the 
carnage inflicted by these youth terrorist fighters has been contained to the areas where 
the Islamic State has held territory. Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria saw almost 
ninety youths parish under the Islamic State flag in suicide attacks or military operations 
over a one-year span from 2015 to 2016.5 Fortunately, this phenomenon has not yet 
manifested in fatalities in the United States. However, a threat from this demographic 
approaches on the horizon. 
 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis challenges the notion that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the 
children of the Islamic State to travel to the United States from Syria or Iraq to carry out 
organized terrorist attacks on American soil. How could a child successfully navigate his 
or her way out of the Islamic State and into the United States? Would he or she have the 
skills and training to evade detection and be able to perpetrate an attack once inside the 
United States? This thesis shows that not only is this plausible, but in some aspects it is 
easier for children to infiltrate the U.S. borders to carry out attacks than it is for adults. In 
addition, foreign youth fighters are potentially dangerous. Evidence suggests that they are 
subject to Islamic extremist indoctrination and training that give them the tools to plan, 
organize, and execute an attack. Using children as an asymmetric attack vector would not 
only inflict physical damage to the victims, but also cause them to suffer aggravated 
emotional and psychological afflictions. 
As the Islamic State deteriorates, it will attempt to expand its operations outside 
the region to project power. Deploying foreign fighters to conduct operations outside of 
the Islamic State is one way in which the West could face additional attacks. The Islamic 
                                                 
4 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis Training Children of Foreign Fighters to Become ‘Next Generation’ of 
Terrorists,” Independent, July 29, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-
training-children-of-foreign-fighters-to-become-next-generation-of-terrorists-a7162911.html. 
5 Mia Bloom, John Horgan, and Charlie Winter, “Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic 
State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015–2016,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 2 (February 2016): 29–32. 
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State’s strategic resources—land, money, and fighters—are dissolving as fast as they 
once appeared. As of 2014, the Islamic State held approximately 34,000 square miles of 
territory in Iraq and Syria.6 This is roughly the equivalent to the landmass of Maine.7 By 
the time this thesis was written in 2017, its territory had shrunk by more than 32 percent, 
to 23,320 square miles, or slightly smaller than West Virginia.8 Some estimates place its 
losses even higher.9 Also, the Islamic State’s finances are receding. From a height of 
approximately $1.9 billion in 2014, recent estimates reveal a decline in revenue of 
80 percent.10 Researchers claim that the Islamic State is generating $192 million per year 
from oil sales, taxes, and other sources.11 In prior years, the Islamic State amassed as 
much as $972 million annually.12 Along with the contraction of territory and finances, 
the number of foreign fighters flowing into Syria and Iraq has dried up; constricted flow, 
defection, and battlefield attrition have resulted in recent estimates of less than half its 
total of approximately 42,000 fighters.13  
 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Adult and child foreign fighters have fought under the black flag of the Islamic 
State and they are now returning to their home countries. The danger returning foreign 
fighters pose was a subject of debate long before the existence of the insurgencies in Iraq 
and Syria. Conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghan and Bosnian wars attracted large numbers 
                                                 
6 “ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN, August 24, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/
index.html. 
7 “States Ranked by Size & Population,” ipl2, accessed September 17, 2017, http://www.ipl.org/ 
div/stateknow/popchart.html. 
8 CNN, “ISIS Fast Facts”; ipl2, “States.” 
9 “Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps,” BBC News, September 21, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 




13 Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley, “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as 
Islamic State Loses Its Edge,” Chicago Tribune, September 10, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/nationworld/ct-islamic-state-foreign-fighters-plummet-20160910-story.html; Marije Meines et al., 
“Manual Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families” (RAN manual, 
Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017), 15, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ 
ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf. 
 4 
of foreign fighters which precipitated discussions on what may happen when the fighters 
returned. The research derived from these battles may provide insight for countries eager 
to assess the potential impact returnees will have on domestic security. However, the 
current landscape is slightly different.  First, the number of Islamic State foreign fighters 
has surpassed the number of foreign fighters in both of these conflicts. Second, the 
foreign fighters are more diverse as they originate from more countries than in previous 
conflicts. Third, the Islamic State’s use of children in martyrdom operations and on the 
battlefield adds a new dimension to the existing debate. This thesis seeks to answer the 
following research question: 
What are the domestic security ramifications posed by the youth terrorist 
fighters indoctrinated by the Islamic State? 
To answer this main question, this thesis explores the following sub-questions: 
• What role does the Islamic State’s socialization of children play in the 
returning foreign fighter (RFF) phenomenon? 
• How do current U.S. policies account for RFFs of all ages, and what have 
other Western-style governments done to address the issue? 
• What are the implications of treating the child soldiers of the Islamic 
States as victims rather than criminal terrorists, or vice versa?  
Europe has a burgeoning security problem because of the number of foreign 
fighters who might return home and carry out attacks. This is based on the theory that the 
numbers of Islamic State foreign fighters directly correlates to a threat for the countries 
that are expecting the return of these fighters. This thought is grounded in the belief that 
an influx of returning foreign fighters will stress the receiving country’s intelligence and 
law-enforcement apparatuses. Thus, a large number of returnees may overwhelm the 
current systems. Governments that do not adopt new policies and practices or recruit 
more counterterrorism operatives face the reality that some returning foreign terrorist 
fighters will slip through the cracks―as they did in Paris and Brussels.  
 5 
Although the actual number of American RFFs may be lower than in Western 
Europe, aggregated foreign fighter totals do not give us an accurate picture of the foreign 
fighter domestic threat. I have found that the danger posed by RFFs is more complex and 
nuanced than a series of numbers on a spreadsheet. Equating the number of returning 
foreign fighters to a future threat is too simplistic; there is a need to prove that there are 
pathways for these returnees. Once pathways are identified, nations can begin to move 
countermeasures into place to manage the flows.  
Before the 2015 attack in Paris, there had only been one other instance of a 
returning Islamic State foreign fighter committing an act of terror on Western soil.14 The 
attacks in Paris and later in Brussels validated prior speculations that Islamic State RFFs 
could successfully plan and conduct attacks in the West. 
With approximately 5–16 percent of the American foreign fighters returning to 
the United States, some have minimized the threat to America from RFFs.15 Researchers 
assert, “We have not seen a case of a foreign fighter from another Western country 
traveling to the United States to conduct an attack,” but they concede “it is not beyond 
the realm of possibility.”16 Some in Congress believe an attack by Islamic State RFFs is 
inevitable due to issues surrounding the Visa Waiver Program and other border-crossing 
policies.17 They contend that there remain conduits to America that RFFs can test and 
potentially exploit.  
                                                 
14 Kevin Rawlinson, “Jewish Museum Shooting Suspect ‘Is Islamic State Torturer,’” Guardian, 
www.theguardian.com, September 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/jewish-
museum-shooting-suspect-islamic-state-torturer-brussels-syria. 
15 Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters Update,” 10; Peter Bergen et al., ISIS in the West: The Western 
Militant Flow to Syria and Iraq (Washington, DC: New America, 2016), 13–18, 
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/12898-isis-in-the-west-march-2016/ISIS-in-the-West-
II.8a0c30a894ec4b96a8340d5b26779456.pdf; Richard Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters 
and the Threat of Returnees,” The Soufan Center, October 2017, 13, http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-
October-2017.pdf. 
16 Bergen et al., “ISIS in the West,” 18. 
17 Combatting Terrorist Travel: Does the Visa Waiver Program Keep Our Nation Safe?, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 114th Cong. 1 (2015), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-114hhrg94579/html/CHRG-114hhrg94579.htm. 
 6 
Not every returnee is dangerous. If policymakers assume that not only adults but 
also children return from the Islamic State, do they place an equal amount of suspicion on 
these children as they do on the adults? The subjugation and exploitation of children in 
the Islamic State should raise concern, both from a humanitarian and from a 
counterterrorism perspective. Aside from the threat of returning foreign fighters evading 
local authorities, RFFs possess particular skills that may make them just as lethal as 
homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). In this respect, neither the academic community 
nor international security services have fully explored the potential consequences of the 
“veteran effect” or the “lag-time challenge” phenomena of the Islamic State’s child 
soldiers.18 For instance, do returning foreign fighters act as mentors to youths, and is 
there an incubation period during which young combatants mature into adult terrorists? 
The authors of a Europol report conducted in 2016 were concerned about this issue when 
they discovered Islamic State propaganda touting the creation of a “next generation 
of fighters.”19  
Some American foreign fighters were as young as eighteen when they traveled to 
Syria and Iraq.20 Other foreign fighters emigrated with their families as children or were 
born in Islamic State hospitals.21 Estimates in 2016 placed approximately 1,500 child 
soldiers in the Islamic State.22 These children, dubbed the “cubs of the caliphate,” have 
                                                 
18 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ 
Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (February 
2013): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000615; David Malet, “Sleeper Agents or Big Yawn? 
Waiting for Returned Foreign Fighters,” Political Violence at a Glance, January 18, 2016, 
https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/01/18/sleeper-agents-or-big-yawn-waiting-for-returned-foreign-
fighters/. 
19 European Police Office (Europol), “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-
SAT) 2016” (report, Europol, 2016), 29. 
20 Jeffrey Imm, “American ISIS—15 of 58 American ISIS Recruits from Minnesota,” Responsible for 
Equality and Liberty (R.E.A.L) (blog), September 30, 2015, http://www.realcourage.org/2015/09/american-
isis-recruits-minnesota/. 
21 Dearden, “Isis Training Children.” 
22 Charlotte Alfred, “A Shocking Number of Kids Are Fighting and Dying For ISIS,” Huffington Post, 
February 19, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-child-soldiers_us_56c779b9e4b0ec6725e 
28d90. 
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conducted suicide bombings and carried out executions of Islamic State prisoners.23 
Islamic State indoctrination and socialization techniques raise questions about the group’s 
strategic use of children.24 Governments face the reality that adolescent Islamic State 
fighters have proven formidable combatants, may have been groomed to carry out a 
multi-generational war, and have pathways to immigration or non-immigrant reentry. In 
this respect, the conversation about how to deal with RFFs should extend to fighters 
of all ages.  
In response to the threat from international terrorist organizations, European 
countries and the United States have re-examined their immigration, visitor, and non-
immigrant reentry policies. Although some have enacted policies to curb the RFF threat, 
specific policies addressing Islamic State returning families and children are rare.25 Most 
of the current policies applicable to children used in conflict zones were fashioned in 
response to wars in places such as Africa and Asia. Those policies may be insufficient as 
the Islamic State’s exploitation of its youth is more than a humanitarian problem. It is 
also a counterterrorism issue.  
 MAJOR FINDINGS 
(1) Finding 1: Avenues exist for youth fighters indoctrinated and socialized 
by the Islamic State to plan, conduct, and execute terrorist operations in 
the United States. 
Islamic State terrorists could disguise themselves among refugees or asylum 
seekers, and enter the United States through legal immigration procedures. The asylum 
process is the most vulnerable immigration procedure that could lead to the entry of 
unaccompanied minors of the Islamic State into the United States. The risk these children 
pose is not nonexistent, but we cannot yet say how dangerous they are. 
                                                 
23 S. J. Prince, “New ISIS Video Shows Child Soldiers Executing & Beheading 5 ‘Kurdish Fighters,’” 
Heavy, August 26, 2016, http://heavy.com/news/2016/08/new-isis-islamic-state-amaq-news-pictures-
videos-kurdish-ypg-peshmerga-execution-beheading-by-boy-child-foreign-soldiers-raqqa-syria-telegram-
full-uncensored-youtube-mp4-download/. 
24 Cole Pinheiro, “The Role of Child Soldiers in a Multigenerational Movement,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 
2 (February 2015): 12. 
25 Elizabeth Pineau, “In Iraq, Hollande Vows to Tackle Foreign Fighters and Their Children,” Reuters, 
January 2, 2017, http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-iraq-hollande-idINKBN14M0A1. 
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(2) Finding 2: Youth fighters of the Islamic State share similarities with the 
child soldiers of other armed groups that influence whether or not they 
will have the propensity to engage in future terrorist attacks. 
The Islamic State’s recruitment, use, and exploitation of children are similar to the 
methods employed by many other groups that send youths into battle. Removing children 
from the conflict zone and keeping them out should be the primary focus of any nation 
concerned with the threat from the Islamic State’s child soldiers. It is important to 
remember that the conflict they need to be removed from is not only the physical battles 
being waged in Syria and Iraq, but also the ideological conflict found in violent jihad. 
(3) Finding 3: U.S. policies are geared toward addressing the humanitarian 
crisis that emerges out of the use of child soldiers, yet we treat the child 
soldiers of terrorist organizations like criminals. 
If we use a spectrum from hard to soft to assess U.S. counterterrorism policies, we 
see that punitive policies outweigh social programs. When minors are arrested on 
suspicion of terrorism, they end up in the juvenile criminal justice system or, in some 
cases, imprisoned as adults. Currently, the United States lacks diversity in the 
counterterrorism policy spectrum, which limits the opportunities for each child returnee 
to be evaluated according to his or her individual barriers to resiliency. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris changed the way the international community 
views the threat of returning foreign fighters (RFFs), reinforcing some people’s 
perceptions of danger and providing a pivot point for others to change their opinions 
about the severity of the threat. In response, governments in western Europe and the 
United States have examined their existing counterterrorism policies and drafted new 
ones designed to address the RFF threat. Punitive (“hard”) and humanitarian (“soft”) 
policies were proposed and implemented by some, designed to lessen the impact of the 
returnees. Although some of the new policies were borne out of emergency legislation, 
others were the result of enhancements to existing laws. However, few have instituted 
any specific legislation that directly addresses adolescent RFFs or the children of 
returning foreign fighters.  
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The literature suggests that RFFs can be explored in two camps: the “alarmists” 
and the “optimists.” The alarmists point to the “veteran effect” as a factor that 
demonstrates a returnee’s effectiveness and lethality. This camp also contends that a “lag 
time” exists, and RFFs are “ticking time bombs” capable of launching attacks in their 
home countries. The optimists challenge both the veteran effect and lag-time concept, 
using empirical data to demonstrate that the occurrence of RFF attacks is infrequent, and 
the threat is manageable. The dichotomy of the two camps is most prevalent among 
academics and researchers. However, the discourse among governments is slightly 
different. Government policymakers debate whether hard policies, soft policies, or a 
combination of both most effectively address the threat from RFFs. 
1. Do Returning Foreign Fighters Pose a Serious Threat?: Alarmists  
and Optimists Weigh In 
Thomas Hegghammer was one of the first to address the issue of RFFs.26 
Focusing on the period between 1990 and 2010, he uses empirical data to assess the 
threat from foreign fighters and debates whether foreign fighters are “lethal terrorists-in-
the-making” or “harmless freedom fighters.”27 Hegghammer limits his work to North 
America, western Europe, and Australia, and in this context defines a foreign fighter as 
“someone who leaves the West to fight somewhere else.”28 While examining the 
motivations of Western radical Islamists, he attests that most foreign fighters are not 
predisposed to return to the West to wage jihad, but some develop an impetus as they 
mature as combatants. He found that although foreign fighters preferred to fight overseas 
rather than domestically, this inclination decreased over the review period.29  
While Hegghammer focused his research on a broad set of radical Islamists, 
others have focused their research specifically on groups that are waging jihad against the 
                                                 
26 Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go.” 
27 Hegghammer, 1. 
28 Hegghammer, 1. 
29 Hegghammer, 10. 
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Syrian government and Shiite groups.30 Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann estimate that 
the number of Europeans who left to fight in Syria increased three-fold during a nine-
month period at the beginning of 2014.31 Citing the 2014 attack at a Jewish museum in 
Brussels, the growing numbers of returning foreign fighters, and the potential for similar 
attacks in the future, they recognize that assessing the threat from RFFs is difficult 
because of the problem’s complex nature. They conclude that the threat is 
“growing…real…multifaceted…and very difficult to assess.”32  
Although the 2014 museum attack in Brussels sparked a global conversation 
about the threat from RFFs, some pointed out that the threat might be over-inflated. After 
years of researching the foreign fighter phenomenon, David Malet argues that historical 
evidence shows “extremely few foreign fighters appear to engage in militant activity after 
their returns.”33 In this respect, he echoes Hegghammer’s findings but also challenges 
Hegghammer’s widely accepted “veteran effect” concept.34  
In 2010, Hegghammer calculated that 11 percent (1 in 9) of foreign fighters return 
to conduct operations domestically.35 In 2014, he revised this estimate to 5 percent after 
conducting more research on the fighters returning from Syria.36 He ultimately claims 
that data show it might even be as low as one-third of 1 percent from that region. 
However, the lower estimates focused on the likelihood of attacks, not their effectiveness. 
Hegghammer’s 2010 research included analysis of the impact of RFFs centered around 
their ability to launch successful terrorist attacks once they returned from abroad. He 
found that domestic plots that involved the participation of veteran foreign fighters were 
                                                 
30 Edwin Bakker, Christoph Paulussen, and Eva Entenmann, “Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters: 
Challenges Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of This Pan-European Problem,” Security and 
Human Rights 25, no. 1 (2014): 13. 
31 Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann, 14. 
32 Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann, 18. 
33 David Malet, “What Does the Evidence Tell Us about the Impact of Foreign Fighters on Home-
Grown Radicalization?,” Radicalisation Research, July 6, 2015, http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/
debate/malet-foreign-fighters-home-grown-radicalization/. 
34 Malet, “What Does the Evidence Tell Us.” 
35 Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go,” 10. 
36 Thomas Hegghammer, “Will ISIS ‘Weaponize’ Foreign Fighters?,” CNN, October 17, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/16/opinion/hegghammer-isis-foreign-fighters/index.html. 
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1.5 times more likely to be executed than operations that did not involve a veteran foreign 
fighter. Additionally, he discovered that veterans were 2.3 times more likely to execute a 
plot that would result in the deaths of others. He concluded that his “data thus 
corroborate[d] existing evidence of a ‘veteran effect’ that makes returnees more lethal 
operatives.”37 Instead of conceding to this finding, Malet challenges Hegghammer’s data 
and claims that the use of social media by modern foreign fighters in theater dilutes the 
impact that returning foreign fighters have in the radicalization process. Malet 
emphasizes that, to aspiring jihadis, the social media sites of those fighters who chose to 
stay in theater may be more exciting than the returnees.38 Also, he argues that returnees 
have “rarely been at the center of recruitment efforts.”39 Malet contends that returning 
foreign fighters may not be as effective as Hegghammer suggests.40 Others, such as 
Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, also warn of exaggerating the threat from returning 
foreign fighters.41  
As scholars and governments debated the scope and legitimacy of the RFF threat, 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud mobilized the terrorist cell that eventually attacked Paris in 2015 
and validated the concerns of many. Before the Paris attacks, government officials and 
some researchers claimed that RFFs were potential “ticking time bombs.”42 A 2013 
investigation found that some Dutch foreign fighters who returned from Syria wished to 
continue waging jihad, while others returned “disillusioned.”43 After the Paris attacks, 
French officials expressed similar concerns that RFFs could enter the country and lie 
                                                 
37 Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?,” 11. 
38 Malet, “What Does the Evidence Tell Us.” 
39 Malet. 
40 Malet, “Sleeper Agents or Big Yawn?” 
41 Daniel L. Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Homeward Bound? Don’t Hype the Threat of Returning 
Jihadists,” Brookings, November 30, 2001, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/homeward-bounddont-
hype-the-threat-of-returning-jihadists/. 
42 Colum Lynch, “Europe’s New ‘Time Bomb’ Is Ticking in Syria,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2013, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/09/europes-new-time-bomb-is-ticking-in-syria/; Yaakov Lappin, “Syrian 
Recruits Are ‘Ticking Time Bomb,’ Study Says. Experts: Foreign Militia Forming Global Jihad Networks 
Back Home,” Jerusalem Post, May 14, 2014, sec. News. 
43 Ronald Sandee and Michael S. Smith II, “Inside the Jihad: Dutch Fighters in Syria,” Kronos 
Advisory, October 2013, 25, http://www.kronosadvisory.com/Kronos_DUTCH.FIGHTERS.IN. 
SYRIA.pdf. 
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dormant while plotting the next attack.44 Malet counters these claims: “If returned jihadis 
are sleepers waiting to strike, then we should see evidence of it.”45 He claims that if a 
“lag time” exists, we should be witnessing attacks from the fighters that returned years 
ago from places like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He concludes, “There is no 
evidence that they present any particular long-term threat of delayed attack.”46  
By 2016, European countries had acknowledged that the threat from returning 
foreign fighters was real. A Europol report attests, “The main concern reported by 
[European Union] Member States continues to be jihadist terrorism and the closely 
related phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to and from conflict zones.”47 
The 2015 report estimates that 5,000 Europeans have left to fight for the Islamic State. 
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague estimates the 
number of foreign fighters is slightly lower (between 3,922 and 4,294).48 The ICCT 
claims that France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium make up the four 
countries with the largest European foreign fighter population. Although France has the 
highest absolute number of foreign fighters, Belgium has the highest per capita 
distribution. The Europol report and the ICCT report both estimate that 20 to 30 percent 
of foreign fighters have returned from the Islamic State. That puts the number of 
returning foreign fighters in Europe somewhere between 784 and 1,500. Applying 
Hegghammer’s statistics would suggest that in 2016 there were between thirteen and 250 
returning foreign fighters in Europe plotting an attack. As it would turn out, seven out of 
the nine main perpetrators of the 2015 attacks in Paris had returned from the Islamic State 
in Syria.49  
                                                 
44 “Ticking Time Bomb of Foreign Fighters Returning to France from Syria,” National, September 9, 
2016, http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/ticking-time-bomb-of-foreign-fighters-returning-to-france-
from-syria. 
45 Malet, “Sleeper Agents or Big Yawn?” 
46 Malet. 
47 Europol, “TE-SAT 2016,” 6. 
48 Bérénice Boutin et al., The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, 
Threats, and Policies (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), 3, http://icct.nl/
publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles-threats-policies/. 
49 Jean-Charles Brisard, “The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France,” CTC 
Sentinel, Special Issue 8, no. 11 (December 2015): 7. 
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Compared to other Western countries, the number foreign fighters in the United 
States is much lower. In 2015, The Soufan Group estimated that forty out of 150–250 
American foreign fighters had returned to the United States.50 As of early 2016, reports 
claim that six Islamic State returnees from Syria had been arrested in the United States; 
one of them, Abdirahaman Sheik Mohamud, was accused of planning an attack in the 
United States.51 According to a database compiled by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), from 1980 to 2016 seventy-
four foreign fighters were implicated in schemes to attack the United States.52 Although 
almost 90 percent of these plots failed, it only took nine attackers in six different attacks 
to amass twenty-four deaths and 1,330 casualties.  
2. Child Soldiers of the Islamic State 
The mastermind of the Paris attacks allegedly traveled to Syria with his 
adolescent brother in 2014.53 At the time, Abdelhamid Abaaoud’s brother was one of the 
many child soldiers operating in the Islamic State. In a study on “the number of children 
and youth militants,” researchers at West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) 
found data that “far exceeds current estimates.”54 The amount of literature on the child 
soldiers of the Islamic State continues to increase as more information flows out of Syria 
and Iraq.  
This literature reveals that the group’s methods for recruitment and use of 
children are similar to the methods used by other groups that deploy children into battle. 
Michael Wessells and J. P. Singer have conducted extensive research on the child 
                                                 
50 Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters Update,” 10, 19. 
51 Peter Bergen and David Sterman, “Will Returning Syria Fighters Strike U.S.?,” CNN, March 25, 
2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/25/opinions/terrorist-fighters-return-from-syria-bergen-sterman/ 
index.html. 
52 Michael Jansen and Patrick James, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States—
Foreign Fighters: Infographics,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, accessed November 3, 2017, 4, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS-
FF_Infographic_Oct2017.pdf. 
53 Ben Farmer, “Who Is Salah Abdeslam and Who Were the Paris Terrorists? Everything We Know 
about the ISIL Attackers,” Telegraph, March 18, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/france/11996120/Paris-attack-what-we-know-about-the-suspects.html. 
54 Bloom, Horgan, and Winter, “Depictions of Children.” 
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soldiers of Africa and Asia. In comparison, John Horgan and Mia Bloom have focused 
much of their research on the Islamic State’s use of child soldiers. In a recent journal 
article, Horgan et al. identified five sources from which the Islamic State obtains its child 
soldiers―the last four overlap with those indicated by Wessells and Singer: 
1. Children of internally displaced people and foreigners (including foreign 
fighters) who travel to Islamic State–controlled territory; 
2. Children volunteered by local fighters and civilians; 
3. Children recruited from local orphanages;  
4. Children involuntarily taken from their parents (i.e., through abduction 
and/or slavery); and 
5. Children volunteers, many of whom are runaways.55 
The first source, children born to foreign fighters or emigrants, was not identified by 
Wessells or Singer as a source of child recruitment in African case studies.56  
Horgan et al. also address the process in which children progress from passive 
recruits to battle-ready soldiers.57 Referencing Singer’s work on child recruitment and 
indoctrination processes, they contend that it is “not just three phases but much more in 
an elaborate, institutionalized effort that is both highly structured and efficient.”58 They 
also point out that the Islamic State’s use of social media and propaganda showcases to 
the world how it recruits and trains children. The scholars claim that this is a fundamental 
difference from what other groups in the world have done.   
While there are similarities between the way African and Asian rebel groups and 
the Islamic State recruit their child soldiers, there are also significant differences. Bloom 
contends that some recruitment measures, as well as the “role the parents and community 
play in recruitment,” highlight the areas where the Islamic State diverges from other 
                                                 
55 John Horgan et al., “From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic 
State,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 8, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.12 
21252. 
56 Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 33–66; P. W. Singer, Children at War (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2006), 57–69. 
57 Horgan et al., “From Cubs to Lions.” 
58 Horgan et al., 7. 
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groups.59 A report from the Quilliam Foundation agrees with Bloom’s assessment and 
offers additional knowledge about how the Islamic State recruits, trains, and uses 
children.60 The authors point out that schooling and education play a critical role in the 
process, which is in contrast to other groups. The authors emphasize that Islamic State 
schools provide the future and hope for the state. They argue that there is a close 
correlation to the way in which Hitler’s Third Reich educated some German youths, and 
“used socialisation to create an adolescent Nazi identity.”61 Researchers at the Quilliam 
Foundation discovered Islamic State curricula designed to create the next generation of 
jihadi terrorists.62  
As researchers discover more information about Islamic State youth and 
government officials draft policies to confront the issue, foreign fighters of all ages from 
Iraq and Syria are returning home. For this reason, the future threat imposed by these 
children needs to be addressed now.  
 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
This thesis contains both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the problem 
space. Quantitative analysis is important because the number of Islamic State foreign 
fighters has been identified by policy analysts as a potential indicator of future attacks in 
the West. The data analyzed in this thesis includes foreign fighter estimates originating 
from multiple sources. Forecasts of foreign fighters compiled by The Soufan Group, New 
America, the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), and the University of 
Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) were used throughout the work. The datasets varied in size and scope. In 
October 2017, The Soufan Group released an update to its 2015 report. While most of the 
datasets were analyzed before the release of this latest report, some of the updated Soufan 
                                                 
59 Mia Bloom, “How the ISIS Recruits And Coerces Children,” The Wire (blog), September 6, 2016, 
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60 Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, The Children of Islamic State (London: Quilliam Foundation, 
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estimates are included in this text. In some instances, the reports and accompanying 
datasets cited in this work contained analyses that provided statistics for foreign fighter 
totals and rates of return or death. However, some did not provide this information. In 
those instances, I calculated the foreign fighter death and returnee averages using the 
foreign fighter totals, death totals, and return totals provided by the sources. The formula 
used in Equation 1 was not derived from any sources.63 It was contrived to help reinforce 
the “potential returnee” conceptual model.  
The main thrust of this thesis is a comparative analysis of government policies 
intended to counter returning foreign fighters. Three countries with Western-style 
governments were chosen based on three variables: (1) the number of RFFs, (2) the 
existence of past terrorist attacks by RFFs, and (3) proximity to the U.S. mainland. The 
strategic counterterrorism policies of Canada, the United Kingdom, and France were 
collected from their respective government websites and reviewed. Many of the policies 
found in the case studies were enacted out of emergency legislation aimed at addressing 
the RFF threat. Canada’s Building Resilience Against Terrorism (BRAT), the United 
Kingdom’s CONTEST strategy, and France’s Action Plan Against Radicalization and 
Terrorism (PART) served as the primary sources for this research. However, some 
policies were also based on the countries’ preexisting legal frameworks. In instances 
when counterterrorism legislation was rooted in the civil or criminal code, I expanded my 
research to examine the specific statutes, rules, and laws. For these occurrences, Criminal 
Code Canada, UK Parliament, and the France Civil Code were the primary sources of 
research. The laws governing juvenile detention and delinquency were also included in 
the country comparison analysis. The information in this thesis about juvenile criminal 
procedures was obtained from the respective countries’ judicial websites and other 
documentation.  
Canada, the United Kingdom, and France were chosen for the country 
comparative analysis primarily based on the information presented in the following 
sections.  
                                                 
63 Equation 1 is presented in Chapter II, Section C1. 
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1. Canada 
The RFF demographics of Canada and the United States are similar. However, 
while not as prolific as they are in Europe, Canadian RFFs may pose more of a threat to 
the United States because of their proximity to the U.S. mainland. The United States and 
Canada share approximately 9,000 kilometers of international border.64 The areas of the 
northern border, which are less protected than areas of the southern border, increase the 
potential for undetected Canadian RFFs to cross into the United States. Even though there 
has not been a scourge of recent terrorist attacks in Canada, previous operations such as 
the 2001 “millennium” plot have used the international border as a point of embarkation. 
2. France 
The French Republic was chosen for analysis for a number of reasons. First, as of 
December 2015, the total number of foreign fighters (1,700) surpassed all other Western 
countries, and the number of returnees (250+) ranked second.65 As of 2017, the estimate 
of French foreign fighters was as high as 1,910.66 Second, France has a history of 
terrorist attacks directed and executed by young Islamic State RFFs. Lastly, it is a U.S. 
Visa Waiver Program participant, therefore generating U.S. border and immigration 
concerns. Every effort was made to find authorized translations of the documents cited in 
the research and analysis. When this was not possible, the documents were translated by 
Google Chrome’s translate feature.  
3. United Kingdom 
In 2016, the ICCT released a research paper that I used to determine the European 
countries that faced the most significant threat from returning foreign fighters.67 To date, 
it is one of the most comprehensive RFF datasets in existence. The ICCT claims that 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are the European countries that 
                                                 
64 “The World Factbook—North America: Canada,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed June 21, 
2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html. 
65 Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters Update,” 7–10. 
66 Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate,” 10. 
67 Boutin et al., The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon. 
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have the highest foreign fighter population.68 Although France was already selected for 
this work, I thought it was necessary to include a second European country for analysis. 
The United Kingdom was selected based on my assessment that it faces a higher potential 
for exposure to young Islamic State RFFs than either Germany or Belgium (see the 
Appendix for more information). 
The overarching counterterrorism policies of the countries examined in this work 
were not compared and contrasted with one another. Rather, the policies and methods 
were analyzed to determine what works, what does not, and how those lessons can be 
applied to U.S. policies. These policies were coded and classified and were analyzed on a 
spectrum ranging from hard to soft, where hard policies are punitive measures and soft 
policies involve the adoption of social programs. Although the case studies were limited 
to these three countries, the classification techniques can be applied to any 
counterterrorism policy of any country. Finally, policies addressing youth foreign fighters 
were also analyzed on a spectrum. This spectrum emulated the classification process used 
to analyze the overarching counterterrorism policies of the comparative countries.  
 THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II defines the threat from RFFs by scrutinizing the concepts introduced in 
the literature review. This section also identifies why foreign fighters are essential to the 
Islamic State and places the number of foreign fighters and RFFs into context. In this 
chapter, I develop a model that challenges the conventional wisdom that correlates the 
threat of RFFs to quantities of foreign fighters. This model interprets why volume can be 
a false metric for assessing danger. Finally, this chapter delved into the methodology of 
what I call the “threat triumvirate.” This concept is based on criminal investigation 
techniques in which motive, means, and opportunity are assessed to determine whether a 
legitimate danger is present.  
The issues surrounding the definition, recruitment, and use of child soldiers are 
examined in Chapter III. This chapter discusses the evolving trends of children in combat 
and how the Islamic State is using child soldiers. Also, this chapter demonstrates that 
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pathways to the United States exist for child soldiers of the Islamic State and introduces a 
geo social–based model that helps scrutinize the threat to the U.S. homeland from Islamic 
State youth. The chapter concludes with the international and domestic policy 
implications of dealing with Islamic State child soldiers.  
Chapters IV, V, and VI showcase country comparisons to demonstrate how the 
examined countries are coping with the RFF phenomenon. It is a probe of the 
overarching counterterrorism policies of Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. The 
country comparison culminates in the development of a model through which policies are 
synthesized, categorized, and aligned along a policy spectrum. Child-specific country 
polices are also investigated and aligned along the spectrum. In Chapter VII, I conclude 
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II. RETURNING HOME PART ONE: DEFINING THE THREAT 
 WHAT IS A FOREIGN FIGHTER? 
Defining the term foreign fighter is an important first step in understanding the 
concepts surrounding the returning foreign fighter (RFF) phenomenon. However, this is 
often easier said than done because this phenomenon is not relegated solely to 
transnational terrorist groups or insurgencies. For example, nation-states have used cadres 
of foreign military personnel to augment forces in times of need, and currently there are 
American civilians and military veterans fighting against the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria.69  
Thomas Hegghammer defines a foreign fighter as “someone who leaves or tries to 
leave the West to fight somewhere else.”70 He uses this definition in his research to 
explain the dichotomy that exists between domestic and foreign jihadi fighters. This 
particular interpretation allows him to define a new set of data when assessing Western 
RFF impact.  
In an earlier work, Hegghammer defines a foreign fighter as “an agent who (1) 
has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the 
conflict state or kinship to its warring factors, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military 
organization, and (4) is unpaid.”71 He applies these constraints to exclude specific groups 
like private military contractors—such as the company formerly known as Blackwater—
and foreign national military branches—such as the French Foreign Legion—in the 
context of examining the rise of foreign fighters in the Muslim world. Applying all of 
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Hegghammer’s foreign fighter criteria to the Islamic State would not be appropriate for 
this work as the Islamic State has paid its foreign fighters as much as $1,000 per month.72 
In his book Foreign Fighters, Malet defines foreign fighters as “noncitizens of 
conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts.”73 Malet refines his definition 
to include three requirements. He states, “I defined a foreign fighter as a member of an 
insurgency who is not a citizen of the state in which civil conflict occurs, has traveled for 
the purpose of becoming an armed belligerent in an intrastate conflict, and is not in the 
employ of a regular state military force.”74 Malet’s delineation also excludes specific 
groups such as mercenaries, private security contractors, and nation-state military units 
consisting of diverse nationalities.75 Malet comingles the terms foreign fighters and 
transnational insurgents throughout his text. He explains that an insurgency is an “armed 
conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to 
a common authority at the outset of hostilities.”76 This definition of an insurgency 
applies to the Islamic State since the group is engaged in battle with the Iraqi government 
and Syrian regime for land and influence.  
In addition to the nuanced variations among definitions, the nomenclature for 
foreign fighters also varies depending on the part of the world from which the author or 
governing body originates. For example, in Europe, foreign terrorist fighter and terrorist 
foreign fighter are the preferred terms, whereas in the United States foreign fighter and 
foreign terrorist fighter are used interchangeably. In Canada, the popular government 
vernacular is extremist traveler.77 In an examination of returning foreign jihadist fighters, 
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Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann suggest that the diaspora of definitions and 
terminology creates confusion and hampers cooperation and understanding of how to 
deal with foreign fighters both before they leave and upon their return. They suggest, 
“Ideally, the definition of a foreign fighter should be unified on a European level.”78 
Likewise, Reed and Pohl assess that Europe’s inability to reach common ground on a 
definition, has “led to much confusion, [and] it has also resulted in a lack of a shared 
perception of the foreign fighter threat.”79  
 FOREIGN FIGHTER IMPORTANCE TO THE ISLAMIC STATE 
Foreign fighters have been an integral component for groups and nations engaged 
in armed combat for thousands of years, and the roles they play vary from conflict to 
conflict. Like the foreign fighters of other wars, those of the Islamic State insurgency are 
an essential element of its fighting force. Daniel Byman believes that “foreign fighters 
play an important—and unusual—role in this endeavor, offering the group scores of 
dedicated fighters, with many assuming leading roles.”80 In 2015, The Soufan Group 
estimated that 31,000 people from eighty-six countries had taken up arms for the Islamic 
State.81 By 2017, estimates rose to over 42,000 from over 120 countries.82 This is an 
increase in the numbers that were reported in the Soviet–Afghan War and more than al-
Qaeda has ever been able to recruit.83 In the Soviet–Afghan conflict, 20,000 foreign 
fighters from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other countries fought to expel infidels.84 
Foreign fighters are a valuable resource to the Islamic for several reasons, 
including their use as propaganda, battlefield reinforcements, and as returnees. Videos 
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released on internet sites and social media outlets are examples of the messaging 
campaign that foreign fighters have undertaken. Stern and Berger explain, “ISIS 
propaganda and messaging is disproportionately slanted toward foreign fighters, both in 
its content and its target audience. Important ISIS messages are commonly released 
simultaneously in English, French, and German, then later translated into other 
languages, such as Russian, Indonesian, and Urdu.”85 The videos and messages do more 
than target foreign recruits; foreign fighters are the key actors in some of the videos, 
which show Islamic State fighters beheading prisoners, calling for hijra to the caliphate, 
and delivering Islamist diatribes to the camera encouraging jihad.86 
The flow of foreign fighters into the Islamic State reached its peak in late 2015. In 
an eighteen-month period, from June 2014 to December 2015, the amount of Islamic 
State foreign fighters doubled, surpassing 30,000.87 Compiling recruits on a global scale, 
almost all of the continents have seen fighters travel to Iraq and Syria, with Europe and 
Asia contributing the most. At the height of its foreign fighter numbers, the Islamic State 
held approximately 33 percent of the land in both Iraq and Syria.88 This illustrates that 
the more foreign fighters the Islamic State had, the more land it controlled. It is also a 
tangible representation of the value that foreign fighters represent to the Islamic State.  
In addition to providing reinforcements, the Center for American Progress claims, 
“These foreign fighters fill leadership roles within the organization’s hierarchy and seem 
to be disproportionately responsible for the atrocities and brutality for which [the Islamic 
State] has become infamous.”89 Perhaps one of the most brutal Islamic State foreign 
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fighters, Mohamed Emwazi—also known as Jihadi John—reportedly traveled to the 
Islamic State in 2013 after changing his name and evading British authorities.90 
Hegghammer points out that there are more foreign fighters than local fighters 
participating in these vicious acts.91 Peter Neumann, director of the International Center 
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, suggests foreign fighters are prone 
to committing such acts because “they are typically people who are not invested in a local 
situation…they often see the conflict in very ideological terms.”92 As an example, 
Neumann cites how foreign fighters had split into ethno-sectarian lines during the 
Bosnian and Chechnyan conflicts and exacerbated the situation. 
Not only does the adult population of foreign fighters provide value to the Islamic 
State, so does the younger generation of foreign fighters, who serve as propagandists and 
a ready-reserve fighting force. The children of foreign fighters from Britain, Egypt, 
Kurdistan, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan have conducted executions for the United States that 
were captured on video.93 Adult foreign fighters have posted images on social media 
sites of their children holding weapons and explosives, and the Islamic State has created a 
martyrdom website eulogizing the deaths of its young soldiers.94 Deaths have come in 
the form of lone suicide operations as well as in units on the battlefield. A Europol report 
states, “In their propaganda, [the Islamic State] has shown that they train these minors to 
become the next generation of foreign terrorist fighters, which may pose a future security 
threat to member states.”95 However, little data exists to illuminate exactly how many 
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children are interred on the front lines. Some of their common roles are as spies, 
preachers, soldiers, executioners, and suicide bombers.96  
Byman recognizes the foreign fighter population is an asset to the Islamic State, 
and its dependence on foreign fighters is a soft spot that could weaken over time.97 
Byman posits many foreign fighters are “poorly trained,” “incompetent,” and breeders of 
discontent between their ranks and the local fighters.98 He also states they can be a 
significant operating expense for the Islamic State. John Mueller and Mark Stewart view 
foreign fighters as a weakness for the Islamic State as well, noting, “the group is likely to 
be penetrated by foreign intelligence operatives.”99 Although the Islamic State expends 
time and resources to mitigate this problem, some interlopers are bound to infiltrate.100 
The Islamic State routinely publicly executes spies and subversives to deter this type of 
behavior.101 
The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria has diminished. With the decrease 
in foreign fighters, Islamic State control of territory has also waned. As many as 2,000 
recruits per month crossed over into Syria at one time. However, this surge dwindled in 
2016.102 If 2015 represented a foreign fighter–fertile period, then the middle of 2016 
represented a drought. In April 2016, the Washington Post reported that foreign fighter 
recruitment by the Islamic State had declined by 90 percent.103 However, some see 
Islamic State foreign fighter statistical trends as a “lagging indicator,” meaning that the 
factors causing the decline may have been affecting the group for some time.104 
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Regardless, many governments are fearing what can be considered an unintended 
consequence of the Islamic State’s loss of territory—returning foreign fighters. 
Finally, foreign fighters are of value to the Islamic State for their potential to 
return to their home countries to launch terrorist attacks. There is a debate among 
academics and government intelligence agencies as to the nature of the threat from RFFs. 
The comparatively larger number of Islamic State returnees—compared to other 
conflicts—complicates the issue.  
 RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS BY THE NUMBERS 
According to Hegghammer, in 2014 the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and 
Syria was more than “[the] number in all previous conflicts combined.”105 Between late 
2015 and late 2017, groups such as the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
(ICCT), The Soufan Group, and New America released reports cataloging the numbers of 
foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. They compiled their data independent of one another 
and the foci of the reports varied. As a result, some of the metrics differ and at times 
conflict. Statistics aggregating the number of foreign terrorist fighters and RFFs have 
been used in media reports to imply that a direct correlation exists between the number of 
fighters and the severity of their threat. I propose that it is more complex than this. 
1. Three Types of Foreign Fighters 
As stated previously, at the height of foreign fighter involvement in the conflict, 
the Islamic State had between 27,000 and 42,000 foreign terrorist fighters at its 
disposal.106 The conventional wisdom is that there are three types of foreign fighters: 
those who stay, those who die, and those who return. Byman explains, “Many of them 
will never go home at all, instead dying in combat or joining new military campaigns 
elsewhere, or they will return disillusioned and not interested in bringing the violence 
with them.”107 
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Estimates of those that stay, die, and return varies depending on the availability of 
source country data. The ICCT and New America both include data from European 
member states; however, the New America data includes other Western countries such as 
the United States and Australia. New America also uses a much smaller dataset 
(604 fighters) than the ICCT study (4,294 fighters).108 As of April 2016, the ICCT 
estimated that among the three types, a majority (47 percent) of European foreign fighters 
remained abroad, while 14 percent died, 30 percent returned, and 9 percent were 
unknown.109 New America places the overall death rate much higher (40 percent) and 
shows that mortality rates of individual countries vary from 8.2 percent (France) to 18.8 
percent (Norway).110 A report by the Guardian claims that the United States believes that 
25,000 of 30,000 (83 percent) of foreign fighters have perished in the conflict.111 This 
number is much higher than most estimates and conflicts with the belief that most foreign 
fighters will live to fight another day. 
Although it is common to think of three distinct groups of foreign fighters—those 
who die, those who stay, and those who return—when assessing numbers and thus the 
potential threat to a country, it is more complicated than it seems. The existing datasets 
mentioned previously were compiled cumulatively over a set number of months and 
recorded as a single snapshot in time. Academics and analysts frequently cite death and 
return rates to project the potential threat from returnees. The problem with this method is 
that these rates represent historical averages and are lagging indicators. Simply stated, as 
soon as the data is published it becomes stale. For this reason, the death and return rates 
may not provide policymakers with enough information.  
Also, the three-group model assumes that those who remain will stay forever and 
are incapable of dying on the battlefield or returning home. I contend that a foreign 
fighter does not face an either-or fate. Of the three types, countries perceive the greatest 
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domestic threat from the returnees because deceased fighters do not pose a risk and 
fighters that stay are limited to operations in Iraq or Syria. I argue that those fighters who 
choose to remain in Iraq and Syria should not be discarded from the risk assessment of 
RFFs since they behave as rational actors and have options available to them, unlike the 
fighters that have died. For this reason, those fighters that stay in theater should be recast 
in the model as potential returnees. 
Viewing the group that stays as potential returnees changes the statistical analysis 
of RFFs. The following cause-and-effect model demonstrates this concept:   
If a fighter does not die, then it is logical that he or she will either stay or 
return.  
If a fighter remains, then we can consider this individual a potential 
returnee, as the options available to the fighter are: perish, continue to 
stay, or return to a country that may or may not be the fighter’s home. This 
cycle continues as long as there is a potential returnee cache. 
A simplistic way to calculate the number of possible returnees is to subtract the 
returnees and those who have died from the total number of foreign fighters in a 
particular country. The remainder would be the number of individuals who could 
potentially return. The potential returnees are then faced with an additional three possible 
outcomes: perish, stay, or return. The result would yield yet another pool of potential 
returnees, and so on, until the options of the returnees are exhausted. To apply value to 
this model, the following inputs must be used: (1) total number of foreign fighters, (2) 
historical death rate average, and (3) historical return rate average. The outputs are the 
adjusted rates of death, stay, and return (see Table 1). 
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Table 1.   Adjusted Rates for Potential Returnees Who Remain, Die, and Return 
 
Using this model provides a different perspective than relying on historical 
averages alone. Thus, it gives policymakers a broader picture of the fighters that might 
return. In Table 1, if the average death rate of 10 percent is applied to 100 fighters, then 
ninety fighters remain who have the potential to return. This is the high limit mark of 
potential returnees since all ninety could return. It is also possible that none of the 
remaining fighters will return. Thus, zero is the lower limit of potential returnees.  
To establish an average adjusted for potentiality, both the mean death and return 
rates should be fed into the model in the form of iterations. In Table 1, the historical 
average death rates and return rates are dependent variables, and the number of potential 
returnees remaining is the independent variable. Although the percentages for death and 
return rate in Table 1 are representative of actual estimates, they are not attributed to any 
specific country and were used for simplicity. 
Iteration 1 represents the number of potential returnees remaining (60), the 
number of dead (10) and the number of returnees (30) after historical death and return 
averages are applied to 100 total fighters. The formula applied to each iteration is 
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 Total Number of Foreign 
Fighters Death Rate Return Rate 
 100 10%112 30%113 
Iteration # of Potential Returnees 
Remaining # of Dead # of Returnees 
1 60 10 30 
2 36 6 18 
3 22 4 11 
4 13 2 6 
5 8 1 4 
End 8 23 69 
Adjusted Rate    8%    23%    69% 
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 PR1 – (PR1 x Rd) + (PR1 x Rr) = PR2, (1) 
where: 
PR1 = number of potential returnees remaining  
PR2 = number of potential returnees remaining (to be applied to next iteration as PR1) 
Rd = rate of death, and 
Rr = rate of return. 
Percentages are rounded up to the whole integer, and the last iteration occurs 
when either the death rate or returnee rate multiplied by the number of potential returnees 
remaining (PR1) declines to no less than one-half (e.g., 8 x .10 = .8). This is the end of the 
iterations since the potential returnees have statistically exhausted all three options. At 
the end of the model, the sums for the number of dead and returnees become the 
numerators, and the total number of foreign fighters is the denominator. The results of 
these two equations are the adjusted rates for the dead and returnees, respectively. The 
sum of potential returnees remaining is not used; rather, the last number for potential 
returnees remaining is multiplied by 100 to establish an adjusted remaining rate. 
The adjusted rates in Table 1 are 8 percent remain, 23 percent dead, and 69 
percent return. Compared to the historical averages in Table 1 of 60 percent remain, 10 
percent dead, and 30 percent return, the introduction of actor choice into the model 
changes the outputs. What remains is a numerical representation of the potential number 
of returnees based on historical averages. 
Decision makers who rely on historical averages to frame policies may be 
underestimating or overestimating the number of future returnees because their data is 
based on past information (i.e., returnees who have already returned and fighters who 
have already died). The adjusted model sets benchmarks for upper and lower levels, 
historical average, and an adjusted rate of returnees. These benchmarks can assist 
policymakers in assessing the number of foreign fighters returning home beyond the use 
of historical averages by displaying a numerical range of possible returnees. 
Data can be injected into the model to provide country-specific information. For 
example, if we use the ICCT and the 2015 Soufan Group data for European Union 
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countries, they estimate that, overall, 14 percent die and 30 percent return, which leaves 
46 percent who stay behind—potential returnees.114 With 46 percent of the foreign 
fighter populace as potential returnees, the historical mean of return (30 percent) has the 
potential to creep upward.  
The Soufan Group estimated that, in 2015, there were 1,700 foreign fighters in 
Iraq and Syria from France.115 They also estimated over 250 (7 percent) had already 
returned, which left 1,450 potential returnees. If approximately 14 percent of potential 
returnees are killed, and an additional 7 percent return, that leaves 1,146 new potential 
returnees who will stay, return, or die. Using the new model, and after twenty-one 
iterations, the percentages change to 10 percent remain, 66 percent die, and 33 percent 
return. These adjusted numbers are similar to the U.S. estimates of Islamic State foreign 
fighter deaths (83 percent), and the ICCT mean of returnees (30 percent).116 An adjusted 
death rate of 66 percent is identical to a West Point CTC study that found 66 percent of 
British foreign fighters had died in the Islamic State.117 However, the adjusted death rate 
and the CTC data run contrary to what Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann conclude. 
They claim, “Although a number die in combat or are otherwise killed, the cases of 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia show that the majority of foreign fighters survive the 
conflict that they joined.”118 They also indicate that most return home after battle. 
Notably, their data is not comparable, as it does not contain any information from the Iraq 
and Syria conflict, which has seen more foreign fighter involvement than Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, and Somalia. 
When assessing death, remain, and return rates, the data show that it is necessary 
to compare apple to apples. The foreign fighters’ variables in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and 
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Somalia make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry over every lesson learned from those 
conflicts.  
Just as every foreign fighter will not die, not every returnee will conduct attacks 
abroad. Exact percentages and numbers of RFFs that cause problems in foreign lands 
vary depending on the period and conflict under examination. One reason for this can be 
explained by Byman’s theory on the foreign fighter’s journey. To perpetrate an attack at 
home, a foreign fighter must complete four phases: (1) decide to join, (2) depart for and 
arrive at the foreign battlefield, (3) train and fight, and (4) return home with the desire to 
continue the fight.119 According to Byman and Shapiro, “Most of those who begin the 
journey do not complete it.”120  
Also, some governments believe that, of those who do return, only a minority will 
cause a problem. For example, the United Kingdom classifies returnees into four 
categories: (1) disturbed, (2) disillusioned, (3) undecided, and (4) dangerous.121 Of these 
categories, the United Kingdom considers the last to be of most concern, accounting for 
10–15 percent of the returning population.122  
Similarly, Phil Gurski, a former Canadian intelligence officer, classifies returnees 
into five categories by activities in which they engage upon return. They are summarized 
as: (1) the “do nothings,” (2) “Broken Men,” (3) radicalizers, (4) jihadi tourists, and (5) 
returnee attackers.123 Gurski explains that Broken Men suffer psychological deficits and 
are likely to tax the health system of the host country. Gurski also clarifies that the 
concept jihadi tourism denotes individuals who travel and return to conflict zones 
multiple times for a litany of reasons.124 This phenomenon occurred in the conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. It also has occurred in Iraq and Syria, which has 
attracted foreign fighters from those previous conflicts. Despite some differences in 
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wording, there are similar groupings in Gurski’s and the United Kingdom’s models, 
reinforcing that not all returnees are deemed a threat.  
Although the estimated numbers of RFFs that pose a threat vary from less than 
1 percent to as high as 25 percent, nobody will know their true impact for years to 
come.125 One method of examining the risk is to assess each country separately. Border-
crossing alliances, such as the European Schengen Area system and the United States 
Visa Waiver Program, have loosened some of the inter-country and intercontinental 
travel constraints. In essence, a country with a small RFF contingency may face a similar 
danger to countries like France, which has the highest European foreign fighter returnee 
population.126 Examining the number of global foreign fighters fighting for the Islamic 
State shows us how complicated it is to determine the number of maleficent foreign 
fighters that will return and conceivably gain entry into the United States. It is even 
harder to ascertain how many of them will be children. 
2. The Numbers Fallacy 
As of December 2015, the unofficial estimate of the number of U.S. foreign 
fighters in Iraq and Syria was 250, while the number of those who had returned was forty, 
or 16 percent (see Table 2).127 A slightly smaller dataset used by New America estimates 
that in March 2016 there were 94 American foreign fighters and 6 percent of them had 
returned to the United States.128 Although the numbers of Canadian returnees were not 
recorded in The Soufan Group’s data, Canada’s number of overall foreign fighters, 130, 
is similar to U.S. numbers.129 Accounting for 380 out of the 30,000 foreign fighters in 
Iraq and Syriaroughly 1 percent of the entire contingentNorth America contributes 
very few fighters to the pool of possible returnees. 
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Table 2.   Summary of Foreign Fighter Estimates, 
December 2015–October 2017130 
Country 
 
Number of Foreign Fighters 
 New America 
The Soufan Group  
ICCT ‘15 ‘17 
United States 94 150-250 <129 no data (nd) 
Canada 26 130 180 nd 
United Kingdom 165 760 850 700–760 
France 1,450 1,700 1,910 >900 
  
Foreign Fighter Returnees 
 
New America 
The Soufan Group 
ICCT ‘15 ‘17 
United States 6 40 7 nd 
Canada nd nd 60 nd 
United Kingdom nd 350 425 >350 
France nd 250 271 246 
  Foreign Fighter Confirmed Deaths 
 
New America 
The Soufan Group 
ICCT ‘15 ‘17 
United States 12 nd nd nd 
Canada nd nd nd nd 
United Kingdom nd nd nd 70 
France 119 nd nd 137 
 
In comparison, data compiled in 2017 by the Soufan Center claims the top 
exporters of foreign fighters during a similar period were Russia (3,417), Saudi Arabia 
(3,244), Jordan (3,000), and Tunisia (2,926).131 While central Asian countries are the top 
four foreign fighter countries, the country with the fifth highest total—France (1,910)—is 
in Europe.132 The Soufan Group discovered that, circa 2015, 5,000 fighters from western 
Europe had traveled to Iraq and Syria, and roughly 3,700 had originated from France, the 
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United Kingdom (760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470).133 Overall, in 2015, western 
European countries contributed 17 percent of the foreign fighter population in Iraq and 
Syria.  
If not all of the foreign fighters die or stay in the Islamic State, then some of them 
are bound to return home at some point. Evidence shows that as the Islamic State loses its 
footing in Iraq and Syria, the inward flow of fighters is declining.134 Declining foreign 
fighter recruits combined with the attrition from battlefield deaths, captures, and 
defections shows that the pool of potential returnees is also contracting. However, that is 
not to say that the number of returnees will decline. On the contrary, countries are 
bracing for an increase in outward flow.  
Canada is preparing for a “flood” of foreign fighters while France recognizes that 
a significant number of future returnees will include women and children.135 Although 
current statistics hover at 30 percent of Western foreign fighters returning, this thesis has 
shown it is possible that the return rate could be as high as 70 percent. However, as of 
2015, that upper percentage of returnees has not been realized. Of the countries reporting 
the number of returnees in the 2015 Soufan Group database, Denmark (50 percent) and 
the United Kingdom (46 percent) represent the two nations with the highest returnee 
historical mean.136 Two of the largest contributors to the foreign fighter problem, Turkey 
and Tunisia, have recorded historical return averages of 30 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively.137 Soufan updates in 2017 revised the foreign fighter estimates for Turkey 
and Tunisia, which resulted in higher return averages of 60 percent and 27 percent, 
respectively.138 Given that European countries are experiencing the largest percentage of 
recorded returnees, it is reasonable that they have concerns. This concern has led 
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European countries to adopt policies and procedures that deal with the returning foreign 
fighters. These policies will be explored in further detail later in this thesis, but one 
omnipresent reaction is for security services to arrest foreign fighters immediately upon 
their return. 
RFF nationals of Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and even the United 
States have recently been arrested after returning or trying to return. Said M’Nari of 
Belgium, Harry Sarfo of the United Kingdom, and Kary Kleman of the United States 
were a few of the bad actors trying to find their way back to the West.139 The 
conventional wisdom that some returnees are more dangerous than others is holding fast. 
While statements from Sarfo and Kleman indicate the Islamic State was not what they 
had envisioned, M’Nari was a founding member of a local Sunni Salafist organization in 
Belgium that preached militant Islam.140 Still, the authorities never indicated that these 
individuals were planning an attack on the West. The challenge, then, becomes figuring 
out who is dangerous and who is not. The RFFs who perpetrated the 2015 attacks in 
France were the former.  
As of 2015, there were an estimated 250 foreign fighters from France that had 
returned home.141 At 15 percent of the total foreign fighter population, the number of 
French returnees is half of the historical European average of 30 percent. However, the 
relatively low number of returnees did not translate into less risk for danger. Mohamed 
Mehra is credited with being the first French RFF in recent times to commit an act of 
terrorism on French soil.142 Although he reportedly fought in Afghanistan and not in 
Syria or Iraq, other RFFs from the Islamic State followed in his tracks. Four of the 
perpetrators of the attacks in Paris, Bilal Hadfiz, Ismael Mostefai, Samy Amimour, and 
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Foued Mohamed-Aggad, were French nationals who had traveled to and returned from 
the Islamic State.143 
The historical average of French RFFs compared to American RFFs is similar 
depending on whether one uses the official American count of 150 (27 percent) or the 
unofficial count of 250 (16 percent).144 The United States has yet to see a successful 
attack by any of its forty American RFFs. However, a few of them were capable of 
attacking the homeland. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud from Columbus, Ohio, was 
arrested on terrorism charges in 2015 after returning from Syria.145 A federal indictment 
claimed that he traveled to Syria, where he attended terrorist training, and was about to 
engage in fighting when a cleric encouraged him to return to the West to carry out an 
attack. The court document states, “MOHAMUD wanted to kill Americans, and 
specifically wanted to target armed forces, police officers, or any uniformed individuals. 
MOHAMUD’s plan was to attack a military facility, and his backup plan was to attack a 
prison.”146  
Another American foreign terrorist fighter, Moner Mohammad Abusalha, traveled 
to Syria where he also trained with a terrorist organization. Abusalha returned to the 
United States and lived in Florida before returning once more to Syria. Upon his rebound 
to Syria, the Floridian blew himself up in a suicide attack that targeted the Assad 
regime.147 According to New America, almost all American foreign fighters who 
returned to the United States were subsequently arrested.148 Abusalha was the exception. 
Although he was capable of attacking the United States, he chose not to; he chose, 
instead, to return to a foreign land to carry out an attack. This example raises questions 
about the nature of the RFF threat. 
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The statistical data from the ICCT, The Soufan Group, and New America are 
valuable in providing decision makers with a view of the foreign fighter landscape. 
However, the numbers offer a panoramic view, and they do little to narrow the threat 
picture. Government officials should use caution if they are relying solely on metrics in 
policy development and implementation. Neither the total number of foreign fighters nor 
RFFs corresponds to an equal level of danger. That is, a country with more foreign 
fighters or RFFs does not necessarily pose a greater danger to that country. Further, death 
rates are historical outputs and not necessarily accurate predictors of future fighter flows. 
If we are to use France as an example, we see how a Western country with one of the 
lowest return rates has suffered the most death and destruction. Although it is logical that 
the more RFFs a state is exposed to the higher the danger, this is not necessarily the case. 
A more accurate statement supports the finding that the more RFF exposure, the more 
potential for danger. That is, the more a country is involved in fighting the Islamic State 
and the weaker its borders, the higher the danger. 
 THE THREAT TRIUMVIRATE: A NOT-SO-CLEAR AND PRESENT 
DANGER 
In December 2014, during testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Representative Lois Frankel of Florida asked Thomas Warrick, the deputy 
assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, “We are to assume that these foreign fighters coming back to our country or to 
our allies pose an immediate present danger to our security, is that something we should 
assume?”149 Warrick replied, “Well, we certainly treat them as if they are a threat.”150 
When pressed by Frankel if they were an immediate threat, he stated, “The answer has to 
be some are and we treat everyone that way until otherwise it can be established.”151 
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If only some foreign fighters are a threat, then not all foreign fighters are threats. 
The difficult task has been sifting out the threats from the non-threats. To attain a better 
understanding of the threat the returnees pose, we can examine three things a terrorist 
needs to conduct an operation: (1) motivation, (2) means, and (3) opportunity. Without 
even one of these, the danger of a terrorist successfully coordinating an attack is low.  
1. Motivation 
Although terrorist organizations have vocalized their dedication to attacking the 
West, some question the Islamic State’s level of motivation for engaging the United 
States on U.S. soil. This doubt focuses on the Islamic State’s documented desire to attack 
the “near” enemy over the “far.” Fawaz Gerges explains that the difference between the 
terms al-Adou al-Baeed (the far enemy) and al-Adou al-Qareeb (the near enemy) 
translates to the United States or Western allied countries and Muslim regimes, 
respectively.152 This concept first emerged from Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj, 
someone Gerges describes as an activist and “ideologue” that had a great deal of 
influence on the jihadi movement.153 Faraj believed it was more important to fight the 
near enemy than the far. Faraj’s justification was rooted in “the colonial presence in 
Muslim lands.”154 
Gerges explains that, as the twentieth century came to a close, jihadis shifted their 
focus from the near enemy to the far, thus taking their struggle global. Evidence of this 
maneuvering is the al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. targets in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and New 
York City. These attacks came after Osama bin Laden’s 1996 “Ladenese Epistle,” in 
which he declared jihad against the United States.155 Hegghammer and Nesser examined 
whether the Islamic State has the same commitment. Their research scrutinizes the 
Islamic State’s words and actions and explores the type of threat the group poses to the 
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West.156 They examined the Islamic State’s declared intentions, the number of Islamic 
State–connected plots, and the nature of those plots. They considered statements from 
Islamic State leadership and fighters, as well as information from propaganda such as 
online postings and the print magazine Dabiq. They looked at the data compiled on 
attacks on the West and developed a typology linking the interactions of attackers to 
Islamic State leaders.  
Hegghammer and Nesser claim that the Islamic State strategy for attacking the 
West is more decentralized than al-Qaeda’s.157 They found “sympathisers,” who had no 
contact with Islamic State leaders, conducted a majority of the Islamic State–linked 
attacks on the West. They also discovered that these types of attacks were increasing in 
frequency. They concluded that the Islamic State “has not yet ‘gone global’ in the sense 
of having committed a substantial proportion of its resources to out-of-area operations. 
Instead, it has assumed a profoundly ambiguous, hard-to-read posture toward terrorism in 
the West.”158 They also claimed that the Islamic State “appears to have succeeded more 
than al-Qaida in triggering so-called ‘individual jihad’ operations by unaffiliated 
sympathisers in the West.”159 Ultimately, they contend that the Islamic State and al-
Qaeda differ in the threat that they pose to the far enemy.  
Others, such as Daniel Byman, emphasize, “The Islamic State is a danger to the 
United States and its allies. Its greatest threat, however, is the Middle East and U.S. 
interests there.”160 Similarly, Mueller and Stewart claim, 
Fears that [the Islamic State] presents a worldwide security threat are not 
[justified]. Its numbers are small, and it has differentiated itself from al-
Qaeda, initially at least, in that it has not sought primarily to target the “far 
                                                 
156 Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser, “Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking 
the West,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (July 21, 2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/
index.php/pot/article/view/440. 
157 Hegghammer and Nesser. 
158 Hegghammer and Nesser. 
159 Hegghammer and Nesser. 
160 Byman, “Understanding the Islamic State,” 153. 
 42 
enemy,” preferring instead to carve out a state in the Middle East for itself, 
mostly killing fellow Muslims who stand in its way.161 
In a 2014 RAND report on The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, 
Seth Jones tracked the number of far- and near-enemy attacks by al-Qaeda and affiliates 
from 2007 to 2013.162 Similar to Mueller and Stewart’s claim, the RAND data “suggests 
that al Qa’ida and its affiliates have deliberately chosen to focus on the near enemy for 
the moment, found it increasingly difficult to strike far-enemy targets, or a combination 
of both.”163 On a high, medium, and low scale, Jones labels the Islamic State’s threat to 
the United States as medium because the Islamic State is most concerned with expanding 
its influence in the region.164 However, Jones notes that a large pool of returning foreign 
fighters in Syria may eventually turn into a larger problem. 
Kim Cragin claims a change in Islamic State mentality occurred between 2014 
and 2016 that shifted emphasis from the near enemy to the far.165 She points to Abu 
Muhammad al-Adnani’s 2016 video, “They Live by Proof,” as the fulcrum that moved 
the focus to the West. Although the Islamic State has developed a prior preference to 
target the near enemy over the far, as it continues to lose land, the reverse foreign fighters 
flow provides them with the levers to move their focus. Regardless of its previous 
disposition, the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris proved the Islamic State was inclined to 
target locations outside of the Middle East and showed that the group possess the 
capability to attack the West.  
2. Means 
It is hard to determine if the U.S. mainland is at the pinnacle of the Islamic State’s 
attack list, but this does not mean that the Islamic State does not pose a domestic danger. 
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The threat from Islamic State RFFs was debated long before the first fighter returned. By 
examining the lessons learned from other conflicts, theories have emerged as to why they 
would pose a threat. One of these theories is called the veteran effect, in which foreign 
fighters undergo a metamorphosis from inexperienced recruits to battle-hardened soldiers 
and return to their homeland more dangerous than when they left.166 Byman explains, 
“Foreign fighters associated with the Islamic State and other groups undergo several 
changes that make them more dangerous. They often begin as callow youths looking for 
adventure, but return as combat veterans who embrace a more radical worldview and 
disassociate themselves from their former friends and family.”167  
Even though domestic terrorist attacks have been conducted in the United States 
by individual jihadis or homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) who have never placed a 
foot in Syria or Iraq, some believe it is the battle-ready returners of the Islamic State that 
will present the biggest problem.168 Hegghammer examined the concept that links 
veterans with lethality in 2013.169 He found some preliminary substantiation for the 
theory, and his recommendation that “policy makers should distinguish between outgoing 
and returning foreign fighters and treat the latter as a threat” has resonated in the West.170 
In 2014, the United States recognized that countering the threat from RFFs was “a critical 
element of our strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.”171 
A 2016 Europol study found that some skills used by terrorists are more effective 
if they are transferred via “direct contact and experience.”172 For example, they cite 
foreign fighters’ use of home-made explosives and expertise in chemical weapons as 
potential subjects for knowledge transfer among European returnees.173 In addition to 
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weapons of war, returnees have shown an ability to evade intelligence agencies and 
disguise their travel.  
The Islamic State has used a technique referred to as broken travel to avoid 
detection of suspicious transit.174 Phil Gurski explains that individuals employing broken 
travel may route their itineraries through countries that are not associated with terrorist 
activity or places that Middle Eastern travelers frequent for vacation or religious 
purposes. Similarly, a tactic frequently used by al-Qaeda operatives is to report a lost or 
stolen passport to the local consulate so a new passport without stamps or any indication 
of travel could be obtained.175 Gurski also notes that Islamic State returnees have avoided 
traveling through countries that have them flagged on watch lists. Several of the Paris 
attackers who were foreign fighters avoided detection during their return by varying their 
routes and using fraudulent passports.176 First-hand accounts from those who have 
traveled to the Islamic State claim that they surrender their passports to the authorities 
upon arrival, thus providing the state with a supply of genuine documents that can be 
altered and redistributed.177  
Former commissioner Janice Kephart states in the 9/11 Commission 
Report, For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. 
Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and 
gain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger, 
because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present 
themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection 
points.178 
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In 2013, Europol warned, “Returning foreign fighters may incite [European Union 
(EU)] volunteers to join the armed struggle in Syria.”179 It admonished, “Also, these 
individuals have the potential to utilize their training, combat experience, knowledge, and 
contacts for terrorist activities inside the EU.”180 Two years later, the Paris attacks 
showcased Islamic State foreign fighters using their training, knowledge, and experience 
to launch an attack. They were able to evade detection upon their entry using forged 
documents and acquire vehicles, weapons, explosives, safe houses, and cash.181 They 
executed a multi-pronged, sophisticated attack and some then slipped out of the country 
undetected. Facing the challenge of weeding out the good from the bad requires 
intelligence agencies to account for all returning foreign fighters. Using tactics such as 
broken travel and forged credentials makes it difficult to keep track of all the returnees.  
Not only can veteran foreign fighters use their training and experience to become 
more lethal operatives, they can also act as mentors and recruiters for youth. Gurski 
provides an anecdote that demonstrates how returning foreign fighters can fulfill these 
roles. In 2014, Gurski attended a public event hosted by the government of Canada 
intended to engage members of the Muslim Canadian population.182 During the event, he 
noticed an argumentative young man who challenged the purpose of the event and 
posited that the government “did not know what we were talking about.”183 Gurski 
witnessed this man project his anti-government and extremist views on others at the 
gathering. His rhetoric eventually escalated the tension in the room to the brink of 
violence. Gurski claims, “It is my opinion that he was recruiting these individuals to 
perhaps follow in his footsteps.”184 After the fact, Gurski found out that this man was a 
foreign fighter returnee from Syria, which convinced him that returnees could have a 
radicalizing influence on others.  
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Researchers studying the radicalization process of homegrown terrorists in the 
United States and the United Kingdom found that “around 20% of the homegrown 
terrorists examined had a spiritual mentor, a more experienced Muslim who gave specific 
instruction and direction during the radicalization process.”185 Although their report was 
conducted before the Islamic State formed, the concept of using mentors to recruit young 
individuals or coordinate attacks has been embraced by the Islamic State. These mentors 
have worked both in person and as virtual mentors online.186   
As a complement to the theory that RFFs can be more lethal than novice HVEs or 
lone-wolf attackers, some insist that returnees have the capacity to lie in wait, allowing 
them to strike at the most opportune time. This concept, referred to as “lag time,” is 
synonymous with the often-quoted concept of a “ticking time bomb.”187 Francois 
Mollins, a terrorism prosecutor in France, refers to the returnees as “time bomb[s]” and 
stresses, “At some time or another we will be faced with the return of a large number of 
French fighters and their families.”188 Mollins predicts that Islamic State fighters will use 
broken travel to hide their return to France. He fears “they will disappear into gaps, only 
to reappear later.”189 Mollins suggests that circuitous routes of return travel will 
contribute to the lag time of attacks.  
Perhaps more nefarious than travel delays is the belief that lag time refers to 
Islamic State sleeper cells infiltrating the West. Stewart Scott, a former State Department 
special agent, states, “A ‘sleeper’ is an operative who infiltrates the society, or even the 
government, of a targeted country and is there to remain dormant until activated by a 
prearranged signal or certain chain of events.”190 He claims that recruiting the right 
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individual to become a sleeper is crucial because of the dangers and mental stress 
involved in maintaining the cover. Further, he emphasizes, “Extensive training in 
tradecraft is needed” for the sleeper, and that operations “must be—by definition—long 
term.”191 He insists that a cell of sleepers is harder to control than individual sleepers and 
that it is vital to differentiate between “grass-root militants,” like the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombers, and sleeper operatives.192 Scott concludes his argument by stating,  
If al Qaeda, the Islamic State or any other transnational organization were 
to demonstrate the strategic vision, reach and tradecraft capabilities 
necessary for deploying true sleepers, there would be far-reaching 
implications for the war against terrorism—ranging from 
counterintelligence policy all the way down to how immigration laws are 
written and enforced.193 
In early 2015, a Europol representative testified before the UK parliament, stating 
that “security services around Europe have indeed been prioritising their work in dealing 
with the foreign fighters who are returned [sic] from Syria and Iraq, what the events in 
Paris last week show is that there is also a threat, clearly, from sleeping networks, 
dormant networks, that suddenly can reawaken.”194 The representative was referring to 
the Charlie Hebdo shooting and not the Paris terrorist attacks, which occurred ten 
months—to the day—after his testimony. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, 
speculation arose that the cell of returning foreign fighters who were operating in France 
and Belgium were part of a secret organization called the Emni.195 Harry Sarfo, a former 
Islamic State recruit, explains that the Emni was a critical component of the Islamic 
State’s ability to target the far enemy. Sarfo told a New York Times reporter that before 
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the attacks, operatives explained, “They have loads of people living in European 
countries and waiting for commands to attack the European people.”196 
Another account of an Islamic State special group recruiting sleeper cell members 
was unveiled in a criminal complaint filed in the United States. Mohamed Jamal Khweis, 
a U.S. citizen, told investigators that members of Jaysh Kalifa tried to recruit him while 
he was staying in a safe house in Raqqa, Syria.197 The affidavit states, “The 
representatives explained that their group was responsible for accepting volunteers from 
foreign countries who would be trained and sent back to their home countries to conduct 
operations and execute attacks on the behalf of ISIL.”198 
If Scott assesses that sleeper cell operations “must be—by definition—long term,” 
then David Malet does not see RFFs filling that role.199 He claims, “There is no evidence 
that [a handful of returned foreign fighters] present any particular long-term threat of 
delayed attack.”200 Malet’s claim is based on data that juxtaposes domestic terror plots 
with waves of returnees from other conflicts. Over the course of time, the small number 
of returnees and the lack of attacks leads him to conclude, “If there is a longer lag time 
between foreign and domestic terror plots, we should see many coming to fruition 
now.”201  
Regardless, there is an unintended consequence of Islamic State RFFs delaying 
their attacks. The longer Islamic State RFFs lie in wait, the greater the possibility that 
intelligence services will unearth them. Governments are increasing their cross-border 
cooperation and are implementing enhanced travel documents. If a lag time exists, it is 
unclear whether this deters or encourages RFFs from launching a covert attack. Again, 
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time will be the best indicator of the impact that travel delays of returnees and sleeper 
cells will have in the West. 
3. Opportunity 
The last piece of the RFF threat triumvirate is the RFF’s opportunity to make it 
out of the Islamic State and into the West. While statistics show that some returnees make 
it to the West, very few have returned to the United States. Even though Europe bears the 
brunt of the returnees, the small number of American returnees is deceiving. At last 
count, the number of American foreign fighters unaccounted for was eight.202 It was not 
until RFF citizens from two U.S. Visa Waiver countries launched an attack on their 
homeland that U.S. policymakers took notice. The attackers were able to take advantage 
of the Schengen system, which allows unrestricted movement between the borders of 
twenty-six European countries. Similarly, the Visa Waiver Program grants citizens from 
thirty-eight countries ninety-day, visa-free tourist travel to the United States. Twenty-five 
of the twenty-six Schengen Area countries (Poland excluded) have U.S. Visa Waiver 
Program privileges.203 The ability for potential returning Islamic State foreign fighters to 
land on U.S. soil undetected was the driving force behind the 2015 Visa Waiver Program 
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act. In addition to the porous borders of 
Europe, the Canadian border and the Mexican border also provide routes for returnees. 
However, returnees’ ability to infiltrate border crossings is not the only concern. 
Foreign fighters can also use the legal immigration process, which involves the 
apportionment of work visas, school visas, and refugee status, as a pathway to the United 
States. Although debate surrounds the likelihood that an Islamic State RFF could 
successfully navigate the U.S. immigration process, it is possible. Moreover, recent 
reports documenting Islamic State operatives infiltrating and recruiting unaccompanied 
minors at refugee camps not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in Lebanon and Jordan, 
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raises new concerns as the Islamic State’s ability to conduct attacks against the West 
broadens.204 
 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has contextualized the foreign fighter threat that the Islamic State 
poses to the United States. By defining what a foreign fighter is, quantifying how many 
could return, and conceptualizing the threat they pose, we are better aligned to examine 
how the children of foreign fighters and foreign fighter youths contribute to the 
complexity of the problem.  
It is difficult to quantify how many young children of the Islamic State pose a 
future problem for the West; the data that The Soufan Group and other researchers have 
compiled do not always differentiate between children and adults.205 Also, the evidence 
presented in this chapter shows us that it is hard to qualify the RFF threat based on 
quantitative data alone. We can, however, find commonalities between adult foreign 
fighters and foreign youth fighters in many areas. For example, the adult RFF concepts 
that describe potential pathways for return, as well their motive, means, and opportunity 
to attack the West, can also be applied to the youth population. Some concepts are more 
transferrable and apparent than others.   
Applying the concepts of the veteran effect and lag time to youths, a theoretical 
model emerges that helps us understand how foreign fighter children of the Islamic State 
can threaten the West (see Figure 1). Veteran foreign fighters, who may be adults or other 
children, act as mentors for recruits. These recruits are indoctrinated and become “ticking 
time bombs” who bide their time and wait for the opportunity to attack. 
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Figure 1.  A Theoretical Model of the “Veteran Effect” on Recruits 
This model echoes the process used by terrorist organizations to groom HVEs. 
José Padilla is an example of an American HVE; a “juvenile miscreant” recruited by 
members of al-Qaeda, he traveled overseas to attend terrorist training and returned home 
to launch an attack.206 Although Padilla was arrested upon his return, by examining his 
path up to his point of capture, we can conclude that the model is reasonable. Lending 
additional credence to the concept, other American-born terrorists, such as the group of 
high school friends referred to as the “Lackawanna Six,” have followed a similar path.207 
Just as all foreign fighters will not return from the battlefield to conduct attacks on 
the West, not all young mentees will become ticking time bombs. With the estimates of 
suspected Islamic State child soldiers ranging from a “couple of hundreds of thousands” 
to a more modest 1,500, the numbers are higher than experts originally thought.208 
Although the West has yet to see an attack on American soil from a juvenile Islamic State 
foreign fighter, more children than ever are conducting lethal attacks against the near 
enemy.209 Also, the age of Islamic State fighters is decreasing as the Islamic State suffers 
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battlefield losses and recruits minors into “sleeper cells.”210 Due to the lack of 
longitudinal data about Islamic State child returnees, figuring out how many might pose a 
threat will be more difficult than simply applying Hegghammer’s previous 
calculations.211 
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III. RETURNING HOME PART TWO: THE CHILDREN 
They are our fighters and leaders of tomorrow, and they will be strong and 
not fearing to die. … In the future you will not only fear our men. You 
must fear our children, too.  
—Anonymous Islamic State operative 
 
On May 15, 2015, in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State in Nigeria, a suicide 
bomber detonated an explosive device outside of a transit station. The explosion killed 
eleven people and injured thirty.212 According to a witness, “a girl aged about 12 
detonated an explosive under her clothes as she approached the station’s perimeter 
fence.”213 A few weeks later in the same city, a ten-year-old girl blew herself up during a 
prayer festival.214 Media reports and local officials blamed the Islamist group Boko 
Haram. The Islamic State and its affiliates, such as Boko Haram and the Harakat Shabaab 
al-Mujahidin (al-Shabaab), are recruiting and using more children than in previous 
years.215   
Whether part of a national force, a non-state armed group, or a terrorist 
organization, the children recruited and used in armed conflict are child soldiers. The 
problem of child soldiers is not new, yet there is evidence that groups such as Boko 
Haram, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State are changing the dynamic.  
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The purpose of this chapter is three-fold: to explore how the Islamic State’s use of 
child soldiers threatens the homeland; to analyze U.S. policy as it relates to child soldiers; 
and to challenge the assertion foreign fighters and child soldiers are pulled into combat 
for differing reasons.216 To better understand the threat that the recruitment and use of IS 
child soldiers may pose to the United States, it is essential to explain what constitutes a 
child soldier and discuss the history surrounding the exploitation of children in armed 
conflict.   
 WHAT IS A CHILD SOLDIER? 
In adherence to the Paris Principles adopted by the international community in 
2007, the United Nations (UN) officially defines a child soldier as:  
A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any 
person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used 
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not 
limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or 
for sexual purposes.217 
The UN considers anyone under the age of eighteen a child. It is important to note that 
this age cap is higher than the cap defined in previously internationally accepted 
definitions. The UN changed this age level from below fifteen—the age defined by 
Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I and II in 1977—because of the proliferation of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers in parts of Africa and Asia in the 1980s and ‘90s.218  
Although children have been used in combat since Spartan times, the last half of 
the 1990s was a defining time for the issue.219 In 1996, UN Secretary-General Graça 
Machel submitted a report to the UN General Assembly that proved to be a critical 
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resource for future studies on child soldiers.220 Not isolated to a particular continent or 
region, Machel’s report identified patterns and applied reasoning to better understand the 
core components of child soldier recruitment, use, prevention, and reconciliation. Annual 
reports now document updates on the global crisis. 
In 2000, the UN proposed the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children 
in Armed Conflict.221 This protocol set goals for the international community aimed at 
protecting children from recruitment and use in armed combat. The core articles in the 
protocol established the following: 
• States will not recruit children under the age of 18 to send them to the 
battlefield. 
• States will not conscript soldiers below the age of 18. 
• States should take all possible measures to prevent such recruitment –
including legislation to prohibit and criminalize the recruitment of 
children under 18 and involve them in hostilities. 
• States will demobilize anyone under 18 conscripted or used in hostilities 
and will provide physical, psychological recovery services and help their 
social reintegration. 
• Armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a country should not, 
under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities anyone under 18.222 
Following the introduction of the Optional Protocol and Machel’s report, the issue 
of child soldiers attracted the world’s attention as news reports surfaced documenting the 
                                                 
220 Graça Machel, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children (A/51/306) (New York: United Nations, 1996), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? 
symbol=A/51/306. 
221 “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict,” United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, accessed November 16, 2016, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/ 
mandate/optional-protocol/. 
222 UN, “Optional Protocol.” 
 56 
atrocities of groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army, and the Revolutionary United Front.223 In 2001, a report compiled by 
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers claimed approximately 300,000 child 
soldiers were operating in thirty countries around the world, the youngest of whom was 
seven years old.224 
 EVOLVING TRENDS 
The annual UN Children in Armed Conflict report in 2016 identified groups in 
fourteen countries that recruit and use child soldiers or commit grave acts of violence 
against children.225 Notably, the report identified a spike in abuse in Somalia, up nearly 
50 percent from the previous year’s data. This trend mirrors media reports of coordinated 
training efforts between Boko Haram and al Shabaab.226 The report also makes a note of 
an upward trend in child abductions by al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and 
the LRA.227  
Originally formed in 1986, the LRA has its roots in Uganda but has spread its 
operations throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, 
and South Sudan.228 Based loosely on religious beliefs—the leader believes he is a 
prophet sent by God—the group is notorious for employing an army predominately 
staffed by youths and sustained through child abductions.229 Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, 
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and the Islamic State are also religious groups that have all used children to further their 
ultimate objective—the establishment of an Islamic “caliphate.” According to a UN 
report, in 2015 there were 555 confirmed reports of child use and recruitment by al-
Shabaab.230 This constituted 62 percent of all reported child use and recruitment 
incidents in Somalia. In Nigeria, Boko Haram contributed to 225 incidents or 82 percent 
of all confirmed reports of child use and recruitment.231 The Islamic State operating in 
Iraq and Syria recruited or used 293 children, or 73 percent, of all confirmed reports 
throughout the two countries.232 Compared to 2014 data, al-Shabaab’s use and 
recruitment increased 27 percent, while the Islamic State’s increased 115 percent.233  
Researchers at West Point’s CTC discovered a disturbing trend after analyzing a 
database they compiled from Islamic State social media reports that paid homage to 
youth martyrs.234 The report shows that the number of children used in suicide attacks 
tripled between 2015 and 2016. Also, the authors suggest that not only is the Islamic 
State changing how it uses children in its operations, but the group is also changing why 
it uses children. Much has been written about the exploitation of Islamic State youth, and 
few disagree that the Islamic State has emerged as one of the world’s worst offenders.  
The Islamic State has used children to commit suicide bombings and perform 
executions. In early 2016, fifteen-year-old Saifullah al-Ansari detonated an explosive 
device at a soccer match in Iraq, killing himself and forty other people.235 Later that year, 
a suspected Islamic State operative who government officials estimated to be between 
twelve and fifteen years old killed fifty-five and injured sixty-six during a suicide 
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bombing that targeted a wedding celebration in Turkey.236 Researchers estimate that in 
2015, the Islamic State sent close to forty youths to their deaths in targeted suicide 
operations using explosive devices.237 Islamic State media outlets have distributed video 
recordings of some of these operations.  
In August 2016, the Islamic State released a video depicting five young operatives 
using pistols to execute captured Kurdish fighters.238 After the video was released, a 
British national identified one of the operatives as his son, Jojo, who was taken to Syria 
by his estranged wife in 2013.239 Reporters stated that his son was ten years old when 
Sally Jones, also known as Umm Hussain al-Britani, took the man’s son to the region.240  
The purpose behind the Islamic State’s use of children has sparked debate. Some 
believe it provides a tactical advantage, while others argue it is strategic. As tactical 
assets, children excel at inflicting psychological damage on the enemy, are easily 
influenced by emotions, and lack the mores to question adult authority figures.241 
Strategically, children can be seen as cheap alternatives to adult fighters; exploding birth 
rates and abject poverty render them expendable casualties of war.242  
Horgan et al. explain that groups’ “decisions to engage children directly may be a 
function of organizational pressure to replenish ranks and/or ensure long-term 
survival.”243 As the Islamic State loses territory to government forces and alliances, using 
children is one way to ensure the group’s long-term survival. If the Islamic State is 
defeated, what will happen to the unknown number of children it has socialized? In a 
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Washington Post article, an anonymous Islamic State operative states, “They are our 
fighters and leaders of tomorrow, and they will be strong and not fearing to die…In the 
future you will not only fear our men. You must fear our children, too.”244  
 A CHILD SOLDIER IS A CHILD SOLDIER IS A CHILD SOLDIER 
At its height, the Islamic State had more than a thousand child soldiers.245 Recent 
battlefield defeats have shrunk its geographical footprint and resources. However, due to 
lack of data, little is known about how many “cubs of the caliphate” still exist and where 
they are. It will take years to fully grasp the extent of the Islamic State child soldier issue, 
but information trickling out of the region from its youth defectors and captives gives us 
insight into the means and methods the group uses to subjugate its youth.  
Child soldier advocates express that child soldiers never actually volunteer to take 
up arms; rather, they are forced into recruitment.246 Mia Bloom contends that the Islamic 
State’s recruitment pattern closely resembles tactics of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
of the Philippines, in which parents “encourage their children to engage in conflict.”247 
However, the Islamic State does employ conscription methods that run parallel to some 
“African groups” that use child soldiers.248  
In an account that resembles the child abduction tactics of some African groups, a 
2015 news article describes the experiences of a fourteen-year-old Islamic State training 
camp escapee that was kidnapped from his village.249 Forced to convert from his ethnic 
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Yazidi religion and pledge bay’ah (an oath of allegiance) to the Islamic State’s leader, the 
youthone of 120practiced decapitating prisoners using a sword and dolls.250 The 
article claims that the boy was taken during the 2014 Sinjar Massacre, when more than 
5,000 Yazidi men were killed by Islamic State insurgents. The Islamic State seized 
Yazidi boys ranging in age from eight to fifteen and took them to a camp where they 
conducted weapons training and hand-to-hand combat, and endured Islamic extremism 
indoctrination.251 In 2017, a journalist reported that the Islamic State used two young 
Yazidi converts to launch a suicide attack on U.S. coalition forces.252 The news outlet 
stated that the young boys—now eleven and twelve years old—were abducted from their 
village during the Sinjar Massacre. 
In another story that mirrors the experiences of children in war-torn Africa, 
Sophie Jones writes about a fourteen-year-old Syrian Islamic State defector who explains 
that he turned to the terrorist group out of desperation.253 Jones describes how the recruit 
followed the path of his older brothers, seeking retribution for the death of family 
members and a razed village in what he thought was a legitimate Syrian regime rebel 
movement. Little did he know that he and the thirty other children in his training camp 
would be subjected to intense Islamic State indoctrination that consisted of extremist 
religious ideology, weapons training, and torture.254 
Also, Anne Speckhard introduces us to Nabil: a sixteen-year-old Islamic State 
captive who recounts a story that echoes the plight of youth soldiers in other regions of 
the world.255 Lacking a father figure, Nabil turned toward a local religious leader and 
eventually succumbed to the false promises and pressures of Islamic State mullahs, who 
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soon facilitated his transformation.256 Speckhard reveals that lessons from foreign sharia 
educators, along with instruction in weapon handling, was part of Nabil’s month-long 
Islamic State curriculum. She also describes how Nabil fought for the Islamic State 
against Peshmerga fighters for four months after his training. Soon after the battle, he 
tried to escape and was whipped after he was caught; however, his second attempt to 
desert was successful, and he was arrested by the Peshmerga while fleeing with the rest 
of his family to Kirkuk.257  
Although the lack of a father figure may not fully explain why Nabil turned to the 
Islamic State, it is not the first time we have seen this path to radicalization emerge from 
youths. A biography about al-Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims, 
“Already in trouble with the law—at 15 he had been involved with a home invasion 
during which one of his relatives was killed—the teenaged Zarqawi was thrown into a 
downward spiral by the death of his father in 1984.”258 Joby Warrick explains, “It was 
[Zarqawi’s] mother who nudged Zarqawi into the Islamists. She signed him up for 
religion classes at the local al-Husayn Ben Ali Mosque, hoping he would find better role 
models among the imams and pious youth, with their ideological debates and fundraising 
drives to benefit Muslim holy warriors in Afghanistan.”259 
It is not just youth from Iraq and Syria who are joining the Islamic State. Many of 
the youth fighters are foreigners. Mia Bloom identifies “children born to foreign fighters 
or emigrants” as one of the five categories of child soldiers living within the Islamic 
State.260 Bloom notes that child recruits have been segregated and indoctrinated 
depending on group associations. For example, she states, “The children in training 
camps tend to be those who have been taken from families or found in orphanages. 
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Children in ISIS-controlled schools, on the other hand, tend to be those whose families 
volunteered them.”261  
It is in the divergence between the children in the training camps and those in the 
schools that we see how the Islamic State fuels its needs. On the one hand, the Islamic 
State requires a supply of suicide bombers that are capable of following orders and 
completing a mission without the interference of the emotional constraints that living 
relatives may impose. There is little need for the Islamic State to invest in the future of 
these children, as they are viewed as tactical assets and expendable resources in a zero-
sum game. Forced ethnic converts such as the Yazidis often fill these roles. On the other 
hand, to survive, the Islamic State must secure its future viability. Socialization through 
early-age schooling provides the group with an avenue to deliver its message to a 
vulnerable and naive population. Bloom explains,  
After Syria devolved into chaos ISIS assumed de-facto control over many 
schools and mosques. Although many of the original Syrian school 
teachers have remained in their positions, they must now teach an ISIS-
controlled curriculum to gender-segregated pupils—one that includes 
weapons training and intense ideological conditioning. Attendance at 
schools does not appear to be mandatory, but many parents willingly send 
their children.262 
Bloom continues, 
At these schools, children systematically learn ISIS’ ideology, bringing 
them closer to each other as well to ISIS members who scout for children 
with the talent to earn “Cub” status in one of the group’s dedicated 
training camps. The educational programs stand in contrast to the 
treatment of child soldiers in Africa, who generally do not receive any sort 
of education.263 
In Bloom’s assertions, we see that Islamic State socialization through school 
curriculum differs than the methods used by rebel groups in Africa. However, these 
factions in Africa and the Islamic State share a method of socialization that forms a 
strong in-group narrative. The daily routine of violating social norms and participating in 





extremely violent acts desensitizes the children and normalizes the behavior. Drawing on 
characteristics of social identity theory, this new in-group narrative transforms the 
children’s identities and lays the foundation for future generations.264 Unearthing the 
similarities and differences in the ways that Islamic State and other groups recruit and use 
children has exposed the complexity of the Islamic State child soldier issue. Adding to 
the problem is an increasing number of avenues for youth radicalization. This is 
important because what was once thought to be a foreign issue is now a domestic 
problem. 
 THE PATHWAYS TO THE UNITED STATES 
One way to explore the threat of Islamic State youth to the U.S. homeland is to 
examine them from a geo-social perspective. We can accomplish this by comparing 
where the youths underwent primary socialization and where they engage in terrorist or 
insurgency operations.265 Here are four paradigms we can use to make this distinction: 
violent extremists (VEs), homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), returning foreign 
fighters (RFFs), and cubs of the caliphate (cubs). Although this method may be too 
simplistic or elementary for some, it allows us to trace and label the patterns in 
socialization lineage. This model assumes that a child is socialized not long after birth 
and adopts the cultural markers of the society in which he or she is raised. At a basic 
level, these paradigms can be defined as follows: 
• Violent Extremists (VEs): Children born outside of the United States (or 
non-U.S. citizens) who travel to the United States and conduct terrorist 
operations inside the United States on behalf of the Islamic State. 
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• Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs): Children born inside of the 
United States or legal residents who conduct terrorist operations inside the 
United States on behalf of the Islamic State.   
• Returning Foreign Fighters (RFFs): Children born outside of the Islamic 
State and inside or outside the United States, who travel to the Islamic 
State and participate in the insurgency, and then travel to the United States 
to conduct terrorist operations. 
• Cubs of the Caliphate (Cubs): Children born inside of the Islamic State 
and who conduct operations inside the Islamic State’s sphere of influence 
or in other parts of the world. 
These categories are not mutually exclusive; an individual can fall into one or 
more group. For example, an HVE can be radicalized in the United States and travel to 
Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State, and then return to the United States to carry 
out an attack. This person could be classified as both an HVE and an RFF. Also, VEs 
may have spent time on the front lines in Iraq or Syria fighting for the Islamic State, and 
then make their way into the United States to carry out a terrorist attack. These 
individuals would be both VEs and RFFs. RFFs are a sub-category of foreign fighters 
that accounts for those individuals of the Islamic State who have remained in Iraq or 
Syria (alive or otherwise). 
This thesis examines the domestic threat to the United States from Islamic State 
youth RFFs and focuses primarily on those individuals who: (1) traveled to the Islamic 
State, (2) participated in the insurgency in Iraq and/or Syria, (3) were not citizens of 
either country (Iraq or Syria), and (4) have since left the region and returned or emigrated 
to the United States or a country that has open immigrant avenues or non-immigrant 
visitor pathways to the United States—specifically, countries with Western-style 
governments. Also, the centerpiece of this work recognizes that RFFs are age agnostic 
and that the United States needs to account for the potential threat to the homeland from 
the Islamic State’s child soldiers. 
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Although it has been reported that there are as many as 31,000 pregnant women in 
the Islamic State, children born at the onset of the caliphate in 2014 would currently only 
be three years old and may not yet have been indoctrinated.266 However, the age of 
indoctrination is young, and there are pictures and reports of an Islamic State propaganda 
video showing a four-year-old blowing up a vehicle containing Islamic State prisoners.267 
Children entering the Islamic State during their formative years are at greater risk for 
indoctrination than newborns, and the number of children indoctrinated by the Islamic 
State may be much higher than 31,000. Shelly Whitman of the Roméo Dallaire Child 
Soldiers Initiative estimates that the amount may be as high as a “couple of hundred 
thousands [sic].”268 
Some children who traveled to the Islamic State with their parents and were 
socialized by the group will return to their country of origin with their parents. Sophie 
Kasiki—an alias—took her son from France to Raqqa, Syria, in 2015 to join the Islamic 
State and later returned with him to France after she described her experience as a 
“hellish nightmare.”269 She claims that she attempted to shield her four-year-old son 
from the environment and even refused to let a man take her son to pray at a mosque. 
However, when she returned to France, she saw a picture the Islamic State had taken of 
her son holding an automatic rifle.   
Some youths will leave their parents behind and travel to the Islamic State to 
fight. Upon their return, they may be minors or adults. Some children will come back 
without their parents or may immigrate to a different country. Others will be adults upon 
their return, perhaps with their own children. As stated previously, it is hard to quantify 
child returnees and their destinations because the data identifying these children is 
inadequate.   
In mid-2017, officials in Belgium updated the Organization for Coordination of 
Threat Analysis register, which is a list of individuals who the government suspects of 
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traveling or attempting to travel to the Islamic State. Included in this database are fighters 
who traveled to the Islamic State and returned to Belgium. Officials claim that out of a 
list of 121 identified Belgium Islamic State RFFs, there was one child who returned.270 A 
review of the list revealed that the child has since turned eighteen. Also, as of July 15, 
2017, there are eight minors remaining on the list. They consist of six males and two 
females. Four of the six males have not returned yet—making them potential returnees—
while the remaining males and all of the females failed in their attempts to travel to the 
Islamic State and are living in Belgium. The youngest minor on the list is one of the two 
male potential returnees and is currently fourteen years old. 
The CTC released a 2016 report that contains an open-source database of 
“individuals who attempted or successfully traveled to Syria and Iraq from 2012–
2015.”271 The dataset includes information on the Islamic State and other groups fighting 
the Syrian regime. The report discovered a correlation among RFFs who were married 
before their arrival in the region. It found, “Of the 11 returnees who were married prior to 
traveling to Iraq and Syria, every one of them had children as well. So, while it appears 
that the fighters who return are more likely to be single, the married fighters who return 
are more likely to have children.”272 The researchers claim that out of 604 foreign 
fighters, roughly eighty-five (14 percent) were under the age of eighteen.273 They also 
calculated that almost 10 percent of those younger than eighteen eventually returned 
home.274 The authors surmise that, “While this study is not able to assign causality for 
the willingness of this profile to travel and join jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq, the fact 
that they have high biographic availability suggests that boredom, the desire for 
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adventure, the influence of friends, the allure of rebellion, and religious or ethnic identity 
may play a role.”275   
 THE CULPABILITY OF IS CHILD SOLDIERS 
International law and human rights agreements frame the legal protections 
afforded to children who engage in armed combat. Individual states are also responsible 
for establishing laws that adhere to humanitarian standards and norms. The Rome 
Statues, the Geneva Convention Protocols, the Paris Principles, and the provisions of the 
Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict are some of the multi-national agreements that address the use of child 
combatants by armed groups.  
In the United States, the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008 prohibits the use 
and recruitment of child soldiers and makes it illegal for the United States to provide aid 
to countries that use child combatants.276 The Child Soldier Accountability Act of 2008 
holds responsible those individuals who recruit and use child soldiers.277 These laws 
attempt to protect children from groups and individuals seeking to exploit them, but they 
do little to punish the children who commit egregious acts of violence.  
Subjecting child soldiers to punitive measures for acts committed while they were 
engaged in an armed group is not a popular practice and is denounced by many. The non-
governmental organization Child Soldiers International claims, “Detained children are 
already vulnerable as a consequence of joining a military organisation. When imprisoned, 
particularly by an opposing party in a violent conflict, they may be at risk of torture, 
sexual abuse, and other ill-treatment, and may be separated from their families and 
communities for a long time.”278 The organization advocates for governments to adhere 
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to international standards and “ensure that children are only ever detained lawfully, as a 
last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”279 
The U.S. Code defines a juvenile as 
a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of 
proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of 
juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first 
birthday, and “juvenile delinquency” is the violation of a law of the United 
States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would 
have been a crime if committed by an adult or a violation by such a 
person.280 
The age dividing line that separates juveniles from adults for most of the United States is 
eighteen. However, some states set their standard lower.281 For example, in New York 
and Texas, the age is sixteen and seventeen, respectively. The Juvenile Law Center 
defines the age of criminal responsibility as “the age at which an individual is subject to 
the jurisdiction of adult criminal court instead of juvenile court.”282 This is sometimes 
referred to as the age of “delinquency” and differs from some definitions that equate 
criminal responsibility to a person’s mental and physical capacity to commit a crime. 
Some states set age boundaries in the juvenile justice system to determine delinquency, 
although many do not.283 In Maryland, the lower age of delinquency is seven years old, 
and the upper age limit is seventeen. This means that children under eighteen and over 
seven can be charged with a crime under the juvenile system. The age of competency is a 
different matter, and states can establish “age-bound” defense statutes. 
Absent specific legislation addressing the RFF juveniles of the Islamic State, adult 
and juvenile criminal justice systems will play an active role in the prosecution, 
sentencing, and detention of returnees. In 2015, a sixteen-year-old Syrian–American was 
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convicted of plotting to kill civilians in the United States and was sentenced to the 
maximum term for a juvenile under South Carolina state law.284 The case was held in 
juvenile court, and the teenager was released from custody three years prior to his 
twenty-first birthday. One year after his release, federal authorities arrested him on adult 
terrorism charges.285 In this instance, when he was arrested as a juvenile the charges were 
not presented by federal prosecutors, but by state attorneys. Also, since the state does not 
have a juvenile terrorism statute, weapons charges were filed instead.286 The U.S. Federal 
Juvenile Delinquency Act allows for the prosecution of juveniles to be a state 
responsibility.287 However, the law reserves federal jurisdiction for cases in which the 
state defers prosecution back to the federal government or in other instances of 
“substantial federal interest.”288 The act does not apply to those individuals who 
committed an act after their 18th birthday. 
U.S. federal prosecutors have filed cases against juveniles for plotting to commit 
attacks in the United States and providing materiel support to the Islamic State, including 
against seventeen-year-olds Imran Rabbani and Ali Shukri Amin.289 Although Rabbani 
and Amin were minors at the time they committed their crimes, they were both tried as 
adults. Rabbani was convicted and sentenced to twenty months in a juvenile detention 
center, while Amin was convicted and sentenced to 136 months in an adult federal 
prison.290 
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The methods of recruitment and use of child soldiers by the Islamic State and its 
affiliates are both familiar and foreign. This dichotomy means that we can draw parallels 
between the Islamic State and other armed groups that use child soldiers while also 
showcasing how the Islamic State differs from these other groups. For example, forced 
and voluntary recruitment is a trademark of some African groups while the Islamic 
State’s indoctrination and social sculpting methods through the use of school curricula 
are few and far between in Africa. However, Maoist communists, as well as other 
organizations (e.g., the Tamil Tigers), have been known to use schools to indoctrinate 
younger generations in an effort to rear their youth for projected resistance.291 Also, what 
was once thought a phenomenon isolated to faraway lands is now encroaching on the 
U.S. homeland. Pathways to the United States exist for Islamic State child soldiers. 
Whether they are children born in the Islamic State, young RFFs, children of foreign 
fighters, or adults who were previously child soldiers, the United States will face a 
challenge when confronted with this returning demographic.  
U.S. domestic and foreign policies are not optimized to deal with the returning 
child soldiers of the Islamic State. Will they be treated as victims, as in the case of the 
child combatants of Africa and Asia, or will they be treated as criminal terrorists, thus 
subject to military tribunals or the U.S. justice system? Both approaches have limitations 
and benefits. This begs the question: Is it an either-or proposition? In the next chapter, we 
explore how other countries are using counterterrorism strategies to address the RFF 
threat and how the youth returnees fit into the policies. 
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IV. RETURNING HOME PART THREE: HOW OTHER 
COUNTRIES ARE COPING 
Islamic State returning foreign fighters have yet to perpetrate an attack on 
American soil. Europe has not been as fortunate. Even before recent attacks in western 
Europe, the European Union (EU) was consolidating efforts to deal with the RFF issue 
through UN resolutions and commitments to country-specific legislation. Countries such 
as the United Kingdom and France have recently enacted strategic counterterrorism 
policies geared toward preventing, detecting, stopping, and recovering from terrorist 
attacks. These policies use legislation—some old and some new—to counter the threat. 
For those European nations that may not have their own strategic policies, the UN has 
passed a series of Security Council resolutions to assist them. 
UN Security Council resolutions 1373, 2178, 2199, and 2253 are a few of the 
measures that call for cooperation and coordination among UN member states to levy 
punishments on terrorist organizations and lone actors.292 Resolution 1373 was signed 
days after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and required that member states develop punitive 
measures to sanction those who finance, facilitate, plan, or conduct acts of terrorism.293 
In 2014, the Security Council enacted Resolution 2178, which focuses primarily 
on the foreign fighter phenomenon. Resolution 2178 serves as a guiding document for 
countries looking to establish border controls, develop intelligence-sharing practices, 
counter violent extremism, and enforce domestic laws prohibiting terrorist travel.294 The 
resolution expresses concern over the “growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters,” 
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especially the cadre traveling to and from the Islamic State.295 Resolutions 2199 and 
2253 soon followed, geared toward suppressing terrorist organizations’ financial assets. 
The UN resolutions focus primarily on “hard” or punitive policy actions that 
facilitate the imprisonment of foreign terrorist fighters and levy financial sanctions on 
terrorist organizations. These policies are enforceable on foreign terrorist fighters both 
before they leave and after the return as seasoned fighters. In the past, other non-
European countries have relied on punitive measures to punish foreign fighters and 
prevent inbound and outbound fighter flows. Hard policies, such as arrest and 
deportation, were standard operating procedures for some neighboring countries 
following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.296 Seth Jones explains, “Most 
Arab states viewed the veterans of Afghanistan as a serious threat: a kind of decentralized 
army of several thousand radicalized warriors. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others 
established border controls to keep them out.”297 A similar fear resonates in the West 
today, and many countries use more hard than “soft” policies to lessen the impact of the 
perceived danger.   
Hard policies are not implemented without criticism; some are calling for a 
balanced approach that incorporates punitive measures along with soft or social-based 
polices. Charles Lister cautions, “Policy imbalance can have dangerous repercussions, 
particularly when immediate-term security objectives ignore long-term issues like social 
integration, community cohesion, and state-citizen relations.”298 He adds, “While both 
hard (criminalization) and liberal (rehabilitation and reintegration) policies have their 
advantages and disadvantages, states should be capable of fusing both approaches within 
more comprehensive strategies for managing this complex issue.”299 This is precisely 
what some countries have done.   
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 SPECTRUM AND FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
As a complement to hard policies, soft measures have found a place in 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategies. Deradicalization programs, community 
outreach initiatives, and reintegration efforts are some of the social-centric approaches 
utilized by countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. Nations have a 
tendency to overweight the hard policies and underweight the soft policies in 
counterterrorism strategies. A helpful way to visualize the imbalance is in the creation of 
a policy spectrum, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Policy Spectrum 
At the green end of the spectrum is soft policies and at the red end is hard policies. 
“Mixed” policies contain both soft and hard policy traits and are located mid-spectrum. 
Mixed policies can also include measures that are difficult to classify as either hard or 
soft. A strategy that has more hard than soft policies will contain a greater amount of red 
than green on the spectrum.  
The spectrum can be used to classify policies at both the micro and macro levels. 
In a micro-level analysis, the provisions that make up a policy or law can be classified 
within the spectrum to give decision makers a visual representation of how hard or soft 
the policy is. For example, if a government is considering revoking the citizenship of 
suspected foreign terrorist fighters, it might construct a law that immediately revokes 
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citizenship without due process or recourse. This policy offers no social component and 
relies solely on a punitive measure. It would be classified in the red field of the spectrum. 
However, if a country instituted successive warnings to the suspect, offered to enroll the 
individual in a deradicalization program, or provided avenues to reacquire citizenship, the 
policy would have more green than the prior proposal. This is important when 
governments take into consideration human rights implications, legal standing, and public 
acceptance during the policy-making process.  
At the macro level, multiple policy actions that comprise an overarching strategic 
counterterrorism policy can be shown on the spectrum, thus projecting a broad view of 
how hard or soft the entire strategy is. The macro-level spectrum analysis method was 
applied to the policies in each case study country.300 In addition to applying the spectrum 
to the comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, I also compared and assessed the 
frameworks of those strategies.301 
The in-place counterterrorism strategies of Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
France are evaluated in this thesis. All three countries employ fundamental elements in 
their strategies that guide their counterterrorism efforts. At a basic level, governments 
must prevent, detect, stop, and respond to terrorist acts. The elements outlined in the 
following strategic policies are synonymous to these various stages of counterterrorism 
operations. In the analyses, the policy actions of governments were coded and assigned a 
corresponding strategic element. For cases in which policy actions could be assigned to 
multiple elements, additional classification was conducted to determine whether the 
element was a primary or secondary function of the measure. For example, although the 
UK CONTEST strategy considers the use of terrorism prevention and investigation 
measures (TPIMs) a Pursue element, it also can be regarded as a measure that is 
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preventative (Prevent) and protective (Protect).302 In this instance, Pursue was assigned 
the primary element and Prevent and Protect were assigned secondary elements.303  
The classification of policy actions according to their elemental properties is 
subjective. Some readers may take exception as to how I coded and classified certain 
policies and measures. While I made an effort to follow the classification guidance of the 
given county’s strategic policy, not all of the policies had clear lines of demarcation. In 
other words, some countries did not specifically claim that policy “X” was a Pursue or 
Prevent element, and in some cases, the measures crosscut multiple elements. Absent 
sufficient classification guidance, I based my decisions on where I thought the measures 
would most likely apply. Some may also object that I did not consider all of the measures 
or policies that a country uses to thwart terrorist activities. While identifying, assessing, 
and coding all of the policies are outside the scope of this work, I have provided a means 
for others to do so. The design and structure of the case study policy spectrum figures can 
be adapted to classify, analyze, and assess any counterterrorism law, measure, or 
policy.304  
 CASE STUDIES 
Four factors were taken into consideration when choosing the countries for the 
case studies. They were: RFF demographics, geography, RFF attack history, and 
existence of an over-arching strategic counterterrorism policy. Specific country selection 
criteria can be found in the Appendix.  
 YOUTH-SPECIFIC POLICES 
Finally, policies addressing child foreign fighters and the children of foreign 
fighters can also be examined on a hard-to-soft spectrum and within the framework of 
overarching counterterrorism strategies. The figures that appear throughout the case study 
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chapters include analyses of some youth-specific policy actions. These policies include 
existing juvenile criminal justice laws, adaptations to counterterrorism legislation, and 
deradicalization programs that target the threat of extremism. While few countries have 
specific policies aimed at addressing the potential return of youth foreign fighters, most 
do not. The youth-specific policies were coded and assessed in a similar fashion as the 
other policies. However, fewer policies were assessed, as child-specific counterterrorism 
measures in general are rare. For this reason, generic juvenile criminal justice laws were 
included in the assessment. It is important to note that juvenile criminal justice statutes 
have been used to prosecute and rehabilitate suspected youth terrorists.   
 CANADA 
Canadian officials have reported that approximately 100 citizens have traveled to 
Turkey, Syria, or Iraq to participate in terrorism.305 As of 2016, the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service estimated that sixty foreign fighters had returned from the region.306 
The number of Canadian RFFs is similar to the number of American returnees, but even 
when combined, the number is small compared to most large European countries. 
However, small numbers do not mean that Canada may not be on the Islamic State’s 
radar. As early as 2014, foreign fighters in Syria delivered a communiqué to North 
America: “This is a message to Canada and all the American tyrants: We are coming and 
we will destroy you, with permission from Allah, the almighty.”307 
1. Strategic Policies 
In 2012, Canada implemented its first comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy.308 Outlined in the government document Building Resilience Against Terrorism 
(BRAT), the strategy focuses on four fundamental components: prevent, detect, deny, 
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and respond.309 These elements and the underlying theme of the strategy (resilience), aim 
to “counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians 
and Canadian interests.”310 The strategy is also rooted in six principles that affirm 
Canadian values. They are:  
1. Building resilience 
2. Terrorism is a crime and will be prosecuted 
3. Adherence to the rule of law 
4. Cooperation and partnership 
5. Proportional and measured response 
6. A flexible and forward-looking approach311 
Canada’s response to the foreign fighter phenomenon touches all four elements of 
the BRAT strategy. In the closer examination of the policy that follows, we look at the 
policy actions, classify them according to the different BRAT elements, demonstrate how 
policies transcend the elements, assign them a place on the hard-to-soft spectrum, and 
explore Canadian child-specific legislation. 
a. Prevent: Counter-terrorism Information Officers, Hotlines, and 
Academic Research 
The purpose of the Prevent element is “to prevent individuals from engaging in 
terrorism.”312 This component seeks to inhibit not only domestic terrorists but also 
terrorist activities abroad. Perhaps the most challenging of the four elements, Prevent 
relies on community investment, early intervention, global outreach, and punitive 
deterrents.313 Although RFFs have already been radicalized or previously engaged in 
violent extremism, the Prevent element still has a part to play.  
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Traditional preventative measures include activities such as countering 
radicalization and violent extremism, and targeting individuals prior to travel abroad. 
When we apply the Prevent element to examine Canada’s responses to RFFs, we have to 
take an alternate approach. In this respect, Prevent policies can also be applied after the 
fact to prevent the return of foreign fighters rather than their radicalization. Most of the 
initiatives under the Prevent element align with its traditional role. For example, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Counter-terrorism Information Officers 
Program is a nation-wide community outreach initiative that trains first-responders to 
recognize precursors to attacks.314 Also, the RCMP distributes a 140-page Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism Awareness Guide, which “raises awareness about terrorism and the 
issue of radicalization to violence. It is intended for first responders, parents, colleagues, 
or friends of persons at-risk.”315 The guide provides a resource to help individuals report 
“situation[s] of concern” on a local and national level.316 The use of hotlines is a 
ubiquitous tool for countering violent extremism among nations faced with the threat. 
Other Canadian proactive measures such as the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security 
and the Kanishka Project engage the public and academia to prevent radicalization and 
stop terrorism before it occurs.317 
Although the Prevent element is inherently proactive, preventing returnees from 
entering Canada can be construed as a course of action that occurs after the fact, or 
reactively. While the remaining three elements of BRAT (Detect, Deny, and Respond) 
play more of a role in reacting to the RFF situation, Canada also has proactive statutes 
that help deny entry to RFFs. Canada’s laws pertaining to terrorism are contained in Part 
II.1, Section 83 of the Canadian Criminal Code. RFFs face up to fourteen years in prison 
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for leaving Canada to fight overseas for a terrorist group.318 Although other statutes 
apply to RFFs, sections 83.181, 83.191, 83.201, and 83.202 specifically address those 
departing Canada who engage in terrorism abroad. These four sections were signed into 
law as part of Canada’s 2012 Bill S-7, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Canada 
Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act.319 During the debate to ratify the bill, 
Senator Linda Frum stated,  
As noted previously, the horrific nature of terrorism requires a proactive 
and preventative approach. These new offenses will allow law 
enforcement to continue to intervene at an early stage in the planning 
process to prevent terrorist acts from being carried out. The new offences 
would send a strong deterrent message, would potentially assist with threat 
mitigation and would make available a higher maximum penalty than 
otherwise would apply.320 
In this respect, these statues act as a deterrent to not only dissuade radicalization but to 
punish those who return to Canada from terrorist groups overseas. This is an example of a 
proactive policy also being used to react to the RFF threat. 
b. Detect and Deny: Deportation, Revocation, Peace Bonds, and Other 
Measures 
The purpose of the Detect element is “to detect the activities of individuals and 
organizations who may pose a terrorist threat,” while the purpose of the Deny element is 
to “deny terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities in order to 
protect Canadians and Canadian interests.”321 Detect and Deny policies complement one 
another and are the two most important elements in Canada’s response to RFFs. Canada’s 
borders are the front lines for these initiatives. 
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As evidence of the importance Canadian authorities place on the security of their 
borders, the term extremist travelers has become synonymous with RFFs.322 However, 
denying inbound threats relies on first detecting them. Intelligence gathering and sharing 
are at the core of Canada’s detection initiatives. The RCMP, the Communications 
Security Establishment Canada, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service work 
together to fulfill the country’s intelligence-collection needs.323 Information sharing with 
NATO countries and other allies throughout the world provides the capacity to 
implement the policies that deny reentry to RFFs from the Islamic State. 
Canada has at its disposal measures such as deportation; passport revocation; 
peace bonds; and investigations, arrests, and prosecutions to counter the RFF threat. The 
Canada Border Services Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Public Safety 
Canada, Transport Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and RCMP work 
together to secure the borders and monitor potential threats.  
Deportation through the Canadian security certificate process allows immigration 
officials to remove permanent residents or foreign nationals on the grounds of national 
security concerns.324 In essence, a security certificate prevents an individual from 
entering the country; if the individual attempts to enter the country, he or she is subject to 
detention and removal pending a hearing. However, the Canadian government maintains 
“a person subject to the security certificate is free to leave Canada at any time.”325  
Canada has used security certificates in the past to detain terrorist subjects. 
However, this practice has garnered much criticism over its use of “secret proceedings” 
and “secret evidence.”326 After an initial finding in 2008 that some of the provisions 
                                                 
322 Theodore Bunker, “Canada Warns of ‘Extremist Travelers,’ Potential Terror Threat,” Newsmax, 
August 29, 2016, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/canada-warns-extremist-travelers/2016/08/29/id/ 
745661/. 
323 Government of Canada, BART, 18. 
324 “Security Certificates,” Public Safety Canada, December 16, 2015, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/ 
cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/scrt-crtfcts-en.aspx. 
325 Public Safety Canada. 
326 Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme Court Upholds Security Certificate Law in Mohamed Harkat Terror 
Case,” Toronto Star, May 14, 2014, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/05/14/supreme_court_ 
upholds_security_certificate_law_in_mohamed_harkat_terror_case.html. 
 81 
violated Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, changes were made and a subsequent 
challenge in 2014 upheld the practice.327 Although it is not an oft-used process (twenty-
seven individuals since 1991), it is a tool that Canada could use to detain and deport non-
Canadian RFFs that slip into the country undetected.328 
According to the Canadian Passport Order:  
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may decide 
that a passport is not to be issued or is to be revoked if he or she has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the decision is necessary to prevent the 
commission of a terrorism offense…or for the national security of Canada 
or a foreign country or state.329 
This law applies to all holders of Canadian passports and has been used by officials to 
revoke the passports of individuals who have left the country as well as those who had 
intentions to exit the country in order to join extremists groups abroad.330 In addition to 
passport revocation, Canada’s Citizenship Act gives the government 
authority to revoke citizenship for certain acts against the national interest 
of Canada. These grounds include convictions of terrorism, high treason, 
treason or spying offenses, depending on the sentence received, or for 
membership in an armed force or organized armed group engaged in 
armed conflict with Canada.331 
Canada used this provision to strip the citizenship of Zakaria Amara.332 Amara was a 
dual-national with Jordanian citizenship who led the Toronto 18 terrorist cell in a plot to 
blow up the Toronto Stock Exchange in 2006.333 Although these tools are viable options 
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to curb the tide of returnees, one of them may be in jeopardy. In May 2017, Canadian Bill 
C-6 passed the Senate vote and is waiting for approval in the House of Commons. 
Expected by many to pass and to be signed into law, it repeals the government’s authority 
to strip Canadian citizenship from dual citizens for terrorism charges and for engaging in 
armed conflict against Canada.334 
RFFs who cross the border back into Canada are subject to immediate arrest. 
Another option is to issue a peace bond for the returnee. The peace bond, referred to as 
“Securities to Keep the Peace” in Section 810 of the criminal code, is a year-long 
protection order imposed on an offender by the court.335 Traditionally used in domestic 
abuse cases, it can also apply to those who may commit an act of terrorism.336 Issuance 
of the bonds is based on reasonable suspicion, and the hearings are conducted outside of 
public purview.337  
Canada used peace bonds to restrict the movements of some of the participants in 
the Toronto 18 terror plot.338 The statute allows the government to impose actions on the 
defendants, including requiring them to enroll in a treatment plan; be monitored with 
electronic devices; have restricted movement to geographical areas; abide by a curfew; 
refrain from the consumption of alcohol and the use of drugs; submit to drug and alcohol 
screening; surrender weapons; and have their passports held in collateral.339   
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The Passenger Protect Program was instituted in 2007 and has become known as 
Canada’s “no-fly list.”340 The program covers both domestic and international flights. 
Names are added to the list if individuals “a) engage or attempt to engage in an act that 
would threaten transportation security; or, b) travel by air to commit certain terrorism 
offences, such as participating in or contributing to terrorist activities or funding, training 
and/or recruitment of a terrorist group.”341 The list, also known as the specified persons 
list, is reviewed every ninety days and there is a recourse process for those who feel they 
have been included on the list in error.342 
The government has the authority to share information on the specified persons 
list with other government entities as well with foreign states.343 The list has grown since 
its inception due in part to program enhancements after Canada’s Secure Air Travel Act, 
and other new anti-terrorism legislation was signed in 2015. Although the program has 
the capability to thwart the return of foreign fighters, it has come under scrutiny recently 
for inaccuracies and for a large number of child names that appear on the list. The 
problems prompted the Canadian public safety minister to admit that Canada requires “an 
entirely new database and information system.”344 The Canadian government has not 
made public the number of names on the specified persons list, but outside estimates top 
2,000.345 
The counterterrorism tools of investigation, arrest, and prosecution allow 
authorities to prevent, detect, deny, and respond to RFFs. The Canadian Criminal Code 
contains provisions that prevent aspiring foreign fighters from leaving Canada and 
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punishes them upon their return. In addition to the 2012 S-7 bill enhancing Canadian 
authorities’ ability to address the threat of RFFs, the 2015 Anti-terrorism Act—known as 
C-51—introduced further tools. The new bill enacted the Security of Canada Information 
Sharing Act, made changes to the Criminal Code, and amended the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.346 The Anti-
terrorism Act addresses the foreign fighter issue in the following ways: 
• Increases information sharing among the Canadian government.347 
• Adds the violation of “advocating or promoting commission of terrorism 
offences” and allows for interception of communications to enforce this 
law.348 
• Allows for seizure of “terrorist propaganda” by warrant.349 
• Amends wording to allow for the warrantless arrest on “reasonable 
grounds” of individuals who “may” or are “likely” to carry out a terrorist 
activity.350 
• Expands the authority of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service by 
allowing them to “take measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce the 
threat.”351 
The act is not an exhaustive list of laws or policy actions that aim to combat the 
returnees, but it is an example of how recent legislative efforts can help. However, 
similar to Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act, the anti-terrorism bill is facing 
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opposition from Canada’s newly elected liberal party. Some of the major provisions are 
unpopular with a portion of the public, who cite civil liberty and privacy concerns.352 
c. Respond 
The purpose of the Respond element is to “respond proportionately, rapidly and in 
an organized manner to terrorist activities and to mitigate their effects.”353 Post-attack, 
the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams assume the responsibilities 
of tracking down additional suspects and preventing further damage.354 Armed with the 
investigative, arrest, and prosecutorial tools outlined in Canada’s Criminal Code, the 
response to RFFs who attack the country would differ little from the response to HVEs or 
domestic terrorists who perpetrate similar attacks. 
2. Youth-Specific Policies 
Children younger than eighteen and older than twelve are subject to the laws in 
the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).355 The juvenile judicial system is 
“separate from the adult system,” recognizes that children “lack the maturity of adults,” 
relies on “fair and proportionate accountability,” and holds offenders responsible while 
acknowledging that children have their own “special guarantees of rights and 
freedoms.”356 
The YCJA emphasizes rehabilitation over incarceration and recent trends have 
shown a proclivity for alternatives to legal prosecution. From 1999 to 2010 there was a 
20-percent increase in the number of “accused youths not charged” versus the “number of 
accused youths charged.”357 Also, youth court cases have been on the decline since 
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2003.358 Even those who are incarcerated and then released have extrajudicial resources. 
For example, 
Under the YCJA, every period of custody is followed by a period of 
supervision and support in the community, as part of the young person’s 
sentence. This includes custody and supervision orders, intensive 
rehabilitative custody and supervision orders, and youth sentences for 
murder. Judges must clearly state in open court the portion of the sentence 
to be served in custody and the portion to be served in the community.359 
Globally, rehabilitation and reintegration programs for child combatants are not as 
widespread as for adults. However, some see it as a necessary step to lessen the damage 
caused to the children returning not only from the Islamic State, but every conflict.360 
Even though Canada recognizes the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, youth 
RFFs are subject to arrest upon their return. The YCJA has provisions that allow children 
as young as fourteen to be sentenced as adults. The crimes that qualify are “serious 
violent offence[s],” which applies to crimes punishable by more than two years.361 The 
act provides jurisdiction to the youth court for terrorism and terrorist activity conducted 
by youths as outlined in the Canadian Criminal Code.362 Canadian authorities may 
incarcerate RFF youths, but more importantly, the rehabilitation and reintegration 
provisions in the YCJA give the government more options to deal with the issue. 
3. Policy Spectrum Evaluation: Canada 
Figure 3 shows how Canada’s BRAT strategy and its policy actions overall are 
evaluated on the hard-to-soft policy spectrum. It also classifies and plots Canada’s 
policies into primary and secondary strategic elements. 
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V. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Lone-wolf attackers and small groups of Islamic State sympathizers have been 
behind some of the most recent terrorist attacks in England. Although some intelligence 
reports claim the Manchester suicide bomber, Salman Abedi, “had ‘proven’ links with the 
Islamic State,” it is unlikely he was a hardened Islamic State foreign fighter.363 Although 
Islamic State RFFs have not conducted an operation on UK soil to date, the potential 
danger returnees present has not diminished. Depending on the source, between 760 and 
850 UK citizens have traveled abroad to support the Islamic State.364 According to the 
2015 Soufan Group dataset, which analyzed approximately 350 returnees, the United 
Kingdom has the largest recorded number or RFFs among European Union countries, and 
the third largest recorded number of all other countries.365 
In 2014, then-Prime Minister John Cameron declared that “the number of foreign 
fighters in [Syria], the number of foreign fighters including those from the UK who could 
try to return to the UK is a real threat to our country.”366 This contention has not faded; 
more recently, British security officials are “particularly concerned by the prospect very 
young children, including some who were born under [Islamic State] rule in either Syria 
or Iraq, going to the UK with their parents.”367 
 STRATEGIC POLICIES 
In 2011, the United Kingdom released its national counterterrorism strategy, 
CONTEST. The United Kingdom’s response to terrorism has changed over the years. 
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Nadav Morag states, “The genesis of UK counterterrorism laws and therefore of 
definitions of terrorism lies in the conflict with Irish nationalism.”368 While combating 
terrorist groups and organizations in northern Ireland remains of high importance to the 
United Kingdom, countering the evolving threat of radical Islamic terrorism is the driving 
force behind the latest manifestation of CONTEST. The approach recognizes the 
potential danger of RFFs and states, “People from the UK are also travelling to these 
countries to engage in terrorist related activity; some are returning to the UK to plan and 
conduct terrorist operations.”369 The RFFs to whom the policy document refers are not 
the fighters from the Islamic State. Rather, in 2011, the UK was most concerned with 
foreign fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia.370 However, as of the 
date of this work, Islamic State RFFs are a major concern for the United Kingdom. 
The CONTEST strategy is organized into four elements or “work streams”: 
Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.371 These four work streams come together to 
“reduce the risk of the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go 
about their lives freely and with confidence.”372 The strategy is grounded in the United 
Kingdom’s “fundamental values.”373 The strategy also pledges “a commitment to human 
rights and the rule of law,” and for the policies to be proportionate, transparent, and 
consistent while holding “the Government to account over its policy and spending 
decisions.”374 
The four elements of CONTEST work in concert. For example, the United 
Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy guide states, “Prevent depends on Pursue to facilitate the 
disruption and conviction of people engaged in radicalisation activities which are clearly 
illegal; Pursue depends on Prevent to restrict the number of people engaging in 
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terrorism-related activity.”375 In this respect, the United Kingdom’s response to the 
foreign fighter threat also crosses all four elements of the CONTEST strategy.  
1. Pursue: The Privilege of Citizenship, Deportation, TPIMs, and Other 
Measures 
The objective of the Pursue element “is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and 
against our interests overseas.”376 According to the British Nationality Act 1981, section 
40(2), “The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.”377 
Although the original law forbade execution of this clause if it made a person stateless, 
the Immigration Act of 2014 changed this.378 Investigative journalists estimate that 
revoking British citizenship, also known as issuing “deprivation orders,” had been used 
fifty-three times from 2006 to 2014.379 It is estimated that in 2013, then-Home Secretary 
Theresa May revoked the citizenship of twenty individuals who may have been foreign 
fighters in Syria.380 However, a 2016 independent review of the powers found that there 
have been no cases of statelessness as a result of the policy.381 The UK government does 
not make public the number of revocations, or even the identities of those who lost their 
citizenship. Although the practice is mired in secrecy, has been challenged in court, and 
has had its effectiveness brought into question, it remains a Purse, Prevent, and Protect 
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tool under CONTEST. Likewise, the British authorities have used the power to strip 
passports from UK citizens for acts or suspicions of terrorism. 
In 2013, Theresa May issued a statement to Parliament, claiming, 
There is no entitlement to a passport and no statutory right to have access 
to a passport. The decision to issue, withdraw, or refuse a British passport 
is at the discretion of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the 
Home Secretary) under the Royal Prerogative.382 
The statement also emphasized that passport revocation could be used to address the RFF 
situation: 
This may include individuals who seek to engage in fighting, extremist 
activity or terrorist training outside the United Kingdom, for example, and 
then return to the UK with enhanced capabilities that they then use to 
conduct an attack on UK soil. The need to disrupt people who travel for 
these purposes has become increasingly apparent with developments in 
various parts of the world.383 
Some claim that the United Kingdom has revoked twenty-one passports since 
2002, with sixteen revocations occurring between 2010 and 2013.384 However, questions 
remain about how this policy has been used lately to combat the tide of RFFs. While the 
Home Office cited thirty-nine uses between 2013 and 2014, most of the revocations were 
conducted before the individual left the United Kingdom and not in response to their 
return.385 Like citizenship stripping, passport revocation is controversial; skeptics 
continually challenge its merits. Another controversial measure is the deportation of 
foreign nationals who pose a threat to the United Kingdom.  
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According to the CONTEST framework, the UK government “believe[s] that as a 
matter of principle foreign nationals who have been engaged in terrorist related activity 
here should be deported when they cannot be convicted or after they have served their 
sentence.”386 The Deportation with Assurances Program negotiates memorandums of 
understanding with other countries to ensure deportees are treated in accordance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.387 An estimate by The Telegraph claims that the 
United Kingdom has only deported twelve foreign nationals under this authority in the 
past ten years, compared to 100 deportations by France.388   
Terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs) are a series of twelve 
measures that can be used independently or combined to monitor the activities and 
restrict or control the physical location of terrorism suspects who cannot be prosecuted or 
deported.389 A less restrictive version of prior “control orders,” the TPIM Act was passed 
in 2011 and enhancements to the act were made in the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015.390 TPIM measures expire in two years and include house arrest, limited travel, 
electronic monitoring, restricted access to financial services, severance of associations 
with particular persons, and other measures.391 
The Home Committee stresses that, along with passport and citizenship 
revocation, the use of TPIMs is vital to disrupting the travel of foreign fighters.392 UK 
authorities used TPIMs to restrict the movement of a British citizen who was a suspected 
Somali foreign fighter. The suspect, Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed, was able to evade 
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the orders and slip out of the country undetected.393 In 2016, six individuals were placed 
on TPIM orders, five of whom were UK citizens.394 However, it is uncertain how many 
are foreign fighter returnees. Some believe that TPIM use is infrequent because “it is 
primarily of use against persons who pose a domestic threat and because it is an 
expensive option.”395 
Other investigative, arrest, and prosecution measures used by the United Kingdom 
include pre-charge detention and stop-and-search measures. Pre-charge detentions or 
“temporary holds” are used to “obtain, preserve, analyze or examine evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings.”396 The statutory limit for pre-charge detention of a terrorism 
suspect after arrest is fourteen days. However, recent events have led the current prime 
minister to consider returning to the previous twenty-eight-day standard.397 Despite the 
call to revert to the longer period, evidence shows that, between 2001 and 2010, 
79 percent of the suspects arrested but not charged under the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000 
were released within forty-eight hours.398 
Statutes in TACT 2000 allow the authorities to stop and search a person based on 
reasonable suspicion that the person is a terrorist, or if authorities possess any evidence 
thereof. In 2015, the Metropolitan Police Service  conducted 520 stop and searches, fifty-
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seven of which (11 percent) resulted in arrest, up 5 percent from the previous year.399 
Through early 2016, data indicate that stop and searches were increasing.400  
2. Prevent: The Channel Program, Community Policing, and Hotlines 
The objective of the Prevent element is “to stop people from becoming terrorists 
or supporting terrorism.”401 According to the Home Office, “Channel is part of the 
Prevent strategy. The process is a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support 
to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism.”402 The program began in 
2012 in England and Wales after an initial experimental phase in 2007. Channel is a 
cyclical process that identifies, assesses, endorses, and reviews referrals for the 
appropriate level of support. Its participants’ vulnerability is evaluated according to three 
criteria: 
• Engagement with a group, cause or ideology, 
• Intent to do harm, and 
• Capability to cause harm.403  
This is accomplished through coordination between the local authorities and 
multi-agency panels. In addition to support plans aimed at countering extremist 
ideologies, some treatments come in the form of mentoring—including teaching 
education skills, life skills, anger management, drug and alcohol awareness—and other 
social services.404 Engagement in the program is voluntary and incarcerated persons, as 
                                                 
399 Anderson, Terrorism Acts, 34–35. 
400 “National Statistics: Operation of Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent 
Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes, and Stop and Search, Great Britain, Financial Year Ending 31 March 




401 Home Government, CONTEST, 10. 
402 “Channel Guidance,” gov.uk, April 23, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
channel-guidance. 
403 Home Government, Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn 
into Terrorism (London: Crown, 2015), 11, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf. 
404 Home Government, 15–17. 
 96 
well as children, can be enrolled. In 2015, 3,995 people were referred to the program, up 
more than 135 percent from a year earlier.405 However, recent events have led the UK 
government to look for alternatives to a voluntary program. Home Secretary Amber Rudd 
referenced the 2016 attacks by RFFs in Belgium as an example of the “challenges we 
continue to face.”406 To counter the challenges, the Home Office stated that it plans to 
implement new measures, including “introducing a new deradicalisation scheme, which 
will be mandatory where the law allows, for those who are further down the path to 
radicalization and who need a particularly intensive type of support.”407 
Prevent engagement officers (PEOs) and police community support officers 
(PCSOs) in local police forces are a vital link between the community and the prevent 
counterterrorism strategy. PEOs “connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood 
policing and communities” by building local coalitions and becoming familiar with 
community problems, while PCSOs “form part of Neighbourhood policing teams and 
work with local communities to provide a visible police presence and build relationships 
with the public.”408 In 2002, it was the intention of the Home Office to develop an 
innovative approach to deterring crime and “anti-social behavior” by increasing the 
visibility of the police force.409 PCSOs have “some, but not all” of the authorities of a 
police constable.410 The role PCSOs play in preventing terrorism is illustrated by a 
former Metropolitan Police commissioner’s claim that one of his PCSOs helped identify 
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all of the bombers in a failed plot to bomb London.411 The PCSO identified one of the 
bombers as an individual who he had come in contact with during a dispute in the 
PCSO’s community.412 Aside from intelligence gathering, PCSOs are also a conduit for 
community reporting. 
The United Kingdom’s Anti-Terrorist Hotline and its online reporting tool not 
only alert police to imminent danger, but they also serve as a means to prevent 
radicalization. Furthering efforts to counter radicalization and violent extremism, the 
Home Office established the Research, Information and Communications Unit in 2007. 
The covert unit—drawing on the expertise of academics and specialists in such areas as 
linguistics and psychology—has “‘road-test[ed] some quite innovative approaches to 
counter-ideology messages.’”413 Adhering to the principle “strategic communications 
aim to affect behavioural and attitudinal change,” the unit sidesteps traditional 
government techniques and contracts out the production of its messages.414 It uses social 
media, the internet, and news outlets to disseminate its narrative.415  
3. Protect: Temporary Exclusion Orders and Watch Lists 
The objective of the Protect element “is to strengthen our protection against a 
terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas and so reduce our 
vulnerability.”416 An independent review of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 
2015 claims, “As well as arrests, the power of examination at the ports under Schedule 7 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 is in the front line of [foreign terrorist fighter] policing.”417 
Schedule 7 outlines port and border controls. 
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Temporary Exclusion Orders or TEOs were developed to “disrupt and control the 
return to the UK of British citizens who have engaged in terrorism-related activity abroad 
(TRA)” and “are enforced through cancelling the individual’s travel documents and 
adding them to watch lists.”418 While naturalized British citizens are subject to passport 
and citizenship revocation, TEOs can be imposed on any British national. The law allows 
the secretary of state to prohibit a British citizen from entering the United Kingdom based 
on reasonable suspicion that the individual has been or is currently is engaged in 
terrorism outside of the United Kingdom. The order can last up to two years. However, 
the government can issue a “permit to return” to grant the individual permission to enter 
the country.419 
Designed specifically to address the RFF threat, the UK government is beginning 
to enforce these orders.420 However, TEOs have only been used in one case, despite the 
existence of approximately 350 British RFFs.421 Some suggest that the tool is 
infrequently used because there are other available options to stop returnees.422 For 
instance, the authorities regularly use the “no-fly list.”  
Two Home Office departments—UK Visas and Immigration, and Border Force 
—play a pivotal role in the Protect work stream. Protecting UK borders from infiltration 
of foreign terrorist fighters and RFFs requires robust screening and vetting procedures. In 
2003, the e-Borders program was established to improve the tracking, information flow, 
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and vetting of passengers entering the United Kingdom.423 The e-Borders program—
designed to be an integrated system capable of capturing information at the point of 
embarkation—was eventually shut down due to cost overruns and contract failures.424 
The termination of the project in 2014 was worrisome to MI5 because it corresponded 
with the revelation that UK foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq were beginning to return 
home.425 Even while e-Borders was operational, the system was using existing watch 
lists to look for suspected criminals. At one point, the UK government claimed that the 
“e-Borders system checks 90 per cent of passengers on flights from outside the EU and 
60 per cent of those from within the EU.”426 
After the termination of e-Borders, focus shifted toward shoring up legacy 
systems.427 As of 2016, a successor program consisting of a “single integrated system” 
was not expected to arrive until 2019.428 Still, the Home Office claims that it checks 100 
percent of passports at controlled arrival points and 86 percent at embarkation points.429 
At last count, estimates of the number of people on the UK terrorism watch list were 
somewhere between 3,000 and 3,500.430 A former UK counterterrorism official estimates 
that, to conduct effective surveillance, it requires a ratio of twelve law enforcement 
officers to one suspect.431 As of March 2015, the combined full-time staff of MI5, MI6, 
                                                 




425 Adrian Weale, “The Half-Billion-Pound IT Failure That Has Left Britain’s Borders Vulnerable,” 
Newsweek, September 3, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/half-billion-pound-it-failure-has-left-britains-
borders-vulnerable-268147. 
426 “Border ‘Watchlist’ Catches Thousands of Criminals,” gov.uk, April 7, 2014, www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/border-watchlist-catches-thousands-of-criminals. 




430 Mark Wilding, “How the Terror Watchlist Actually Works,” Vice, June 6, 2017, 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/how-the-terror-watchlist-actually-works; Jon Austin, “Terror in 
Manchester: 3,500 Potential Terrorists & 400 ISIS Fighters Back from Syria in UK,” Express, May 23, 
2017, http://www.express.co.uk/pictures/pics/11307/Mosul-iraq-daesh-ISIS-islamic-State-army-military-
war-bomb-pictures. 
431 Wilding, “Terror Watchlist.” 
 100 
and Government Communications Headquarters was 12,080.432 This skews the numbers 
in favor of the suspected terrorists and requires counter-intelligence agencies to assess 
risk and prioritize targets. Recent attacks in the United Kingdom perpetrated by 
previously known terror suspects demonstrates the vulnerabilities in this process. 
4. Prepare 
The objective of the Prepare element “is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist 
attack where that attack cannot be stopped.”433 Although this element concerns the 
aftermath of an attack, new police tactics have provided enhanced emergency response to 
firearms and unconventional attacks.434 Also, investigative practices such as stop-and-
search and pre-charge detention following an incident have allowed UK authorities to 
disrupt follow-on attacks.  
 YOUTH-SPECIFIC POLICIES 
1. Deradicalization  
The Channel program’s purview encompasses adults and children. In just one 
region of the United Kingdom in 2015, 486 children were referred to the program. While 
the majority (235) were aged fifteen to nineteen, sixty-eight were nine years old or 
under.435 During the same year in England and Wales, a combined 1,424 children 
between the ages of eleven and fifteen were referred.436   
The effectiveness of Channel and other deradicalization programs was challenged 
after multiple incidents of failure. A fourteen-year-old participant of the Channel program 
was arrested less than a year and a half after his enrollment for plotting a terrorist attack 
in Australia during Anzac Day.437 Also, a nineteen-year-old Islamic State supporter was 
arrested and sentenced to twenty-two years in prison after plotting to attack a British 
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soldier.438 The youth was offered and subsequently refused deradicalization opportunities 
three times.439 While a few incidents among thousands do not constitute systemic failure, 
without more accurate measurements of effectiveness such as rates of recidivism, 
effectiveness of the prevent programs for youths will remain debatable. 
2. Rehabilitation 
The UK Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 sets age limits for criminal 
responsibility in England and Wales, which is currently ten years old.440 While eighteen 
is the adult age in the United Kingdom, children over the age of ten and under eighteen 
are prosecuted as juveniles. Youth Justice Board statistics for 2014 and 2015 show arrests 
of youths between the ages of ten and seventeen account for 10 percent of all arrests in 
England and Wales.441 The youth are not immune to terrorism charges in the United 
Kingdom. In 2015, the United Kingdom tried a fourteen-year-old in juvenile court on 
“two offences of inciting terrorist acts.”442 He was found guilty and sentenced to life in 
prison.443 However, because of his age, after five years confinement, his dangerousness 
will be reevaluated to determine if further incarceration is needed.444 
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3. Deportation 
Under UK law, unaccompanied foreign minors face deportation once they reach 
age 18. The Home Office reviews petitions to remain in country, however, if 
unaccompanied children of the IS find their way into the UK, this is a tactic the UK has 
at their disposal to expel them once they are adults. According to one report, from 2007 
to 2016 the UK sent more than 2,700 youths back to such countries as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Iran, Libya, and Syria.445 
 POLICY SPECTRUM EVALUATION: UNITED KINGDOM 
Figure 4 shows how The United Kingdom’s CONTEST strategy and its policy 
actions overall are evaluated on the hard-to-soft policy spectrum. It also classifies and 
plots the United Kingdom’s policies into primary and secondary strategic elements. 
                                                 
445 “The Thousands of Former Child Refugees Deported to Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Bureau of 




Figure 4.  Policy Spectrum: The United Kingdom’s CONTEST Strategy 
  
 104 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 105 
VI. FRANCE 
Statistics show that France has contributed between 900 and 1,910 foreign 
fighters to the conflict in Iraq and Syria.446 With France contributing more fighters than 
any other western European nation, it is understandable that in 2015 it ranked second 
among European countries and fourth worldwide in recorded number of returnees.447 
France realized the threat of its 250 or so foreign fighter returnees during the 2015 attacks 
in Paris and the 2016 Brussels Airport attack. Following the Paris attacks, France 
instituted a state of emergency, under which it is still governing. 
France recently adopted an over-arching counterterrorism policy similar to 
Canada’s BRAT and the United Kingdom’s CONTEST. Over the course of the past five 
years, France has been bolstering its legislation and aligning assets to address recent 
terrorism trends.448 France relies on a combination of legal and administrative measures 
to combat terrorism and, specifically, returning foreign fighters. Some of the policies 
backing these actions arise from existing civil law, the 2014 Action Plan, and the 2015 
state of emergency.  
Maintaining uniformity, this case study on France aligns France’s policies on a 
hard-to-soft spectrum and categorizes the policies according to strategic elements. 
France’s Action Plan Against Radicalization and Terrorism (PART) was adopted in May 
2016 and was designed to consolidate counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts into a 
whole-of-government approach.449 Consisting of eighty measures, it was an upgrade 
from the 2014 National Action Plan against Violent Radicalization and Jihadi Networks, 
which had twenty-four measures.450 
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 STRATEGIC POLICIES 
France’s PART focuses on seven areas of engagement: 
1. Detecting signs of radicalization paths and terrorist networks at the earliest 
stage possible; 
2. Monitoring, obstructing and neutralizing terrorist networks; 
3. Combating terrorism within its international networks and safe havens; 
4. Increasing the reach of radicalization prevention mechanisms in order to 
ensure personalized measures for different populations; 
5. Developing applied research in terms of counter-speech involving 
France’s Islamic community; 
6. Improving protection of vulnerable sites and networks; 
7. Being able to react to any terrorist attack and demonstrate the Nation’s 
resilience.451 
Identifying commonalities among these focus areas, they can be consolidated into five 
elements: Prevent, Detect, Combat, Protect, and React. 
1. Prevent: Hotlines, the Internet, and Deradicalization 
The Prevent element combines the fourth and fifth focus areas, whose objectives 
are to prevent radicalization and develop counter-narratives to radicalization.452 This is 
accomplished through measures such as hotlines, community outreach, and 
deradicalization programs. 
Launched in 2014, the NuméroVert (green number)—the equivalent of a toll-free 
number in the United States—was established to aid families who wanted to report 
relatives they believed to be radicalized.453 The hotline was created out of concerns about 
the number of French nationals traveling to Syria and it started receiving calls as soon as 
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it went active.454 In a year and a half, the hotline produced 3,000 tips, with more than 
one-fourth attributed to youths.455  
Answering the hotline are “retired security personnel” who are trained by the 
Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (UCLAT), with assistance from psychologists and 
police officers.456 Although the hotline members have many years of work experience in 
law enforcement, a UCLAT official claims, “They were chosen for their listening skills 
and emotional sensitivity.”457 Despite the volume of the incoming calls, critics of the 
effort question its efficacy. Dounia Bouzar, a specialist on radicalization, said, “It was 
hard enough to get in touch with the working class, who already don’t trust state 
institutions. When the hotline was set up everyone knew the police was on the other 
side of the line. The only parents who called this number were those who had faith in 
their institutions and who could afford a lawyer.”458 The consensus among private 
groups and the government was that more efforts to counter radicalization were needed; 
in 2015, the online campaign “Stop-Jihadism” was launched to counter Islamic State 
propaganda, which had become a ubiquitous recruiting tool for foreign fighters on the 
internet.459  
In late-2016, France opened its first of twelve deradicalization centers, the Center 
for Prevention, Integration, and Citizenship. Its purpose is “to provide ‘psychological, 
medico-social, and educational support’ to facilitate ‘disengagement from radicalization, 
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development of a critical mind, and appropriation of citizenship and republican 
values.’”460 To gain admittance into the center, individuals come forward voluntarily and 
must verify that they have “never been convicted for acts linked to terrorism.”461 
Although the program seems suited more for aspiring foreign fighters, it is possible that 
the centers could house returnees if they are not criminally charged, prosecuted, and 
convicted. A French-funded research effort comparing deradicalization programs across 
Europe found that “one of the takeaways is that there is no clear takeaway,” and that “this 
is trial and error.”462 
As of February 2017, France’s experimental centers had not logged any 
participants.463 Government officials blamed location and poor planning for the lack of 
engagement.464 However, critics of the centers feel that the nationalistic approach used 
by the centers—a military-style boarding school—only exacerbates one of the driving 
factors of radicalization; “decisive rejection of the authority of the state in favor of the 
new political identity of a new community.”465 Opponents of deradicalization suggest 
that there may be different interpretations of the concept of prevention. While the 
facilities are touted to be centers for prevention, some claim “it’s impossible to 
deradicalize individuals…the best thing to do is act with preventative measures, rather 
than trying to change the minds of people after the fact.”466  
2. Detect: Detention Orders and Passenger Name Records (PNRs) 
The Detect element is the first focus area of France’s PART strategy. Measures 
such as detention orders and passenger name records (PNRs) aid in the early detection of 
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terrorists and their networks.467 Detention orders can be classified as “pre-charge” or 
“pre-trial.” Pre-charge orders, also known as garde à vue, are holds that are usually 
restricted to a maximum of twenty-four hours unless the individual is a suspected 
terrorist, in which case a hold of four to eight days is authorized.468 The terrorism clause 
also allows police to withhold a suspect’s legal representation and conduct custodial 
interrogation for three days.469  
Pre-trial detention, or détention provisoire, is “recommended only if it is 
necessary to preserve material evidence, prevent witness pressure, prevent flight, or to 
protect the accused, but is quite common in terrorism cases,” and may persist for four 
years.470 Outlined in Section VII Article 137 Code of Criminal Procedure, detention 
orders allow French authorities to round up and question suspects, gather intelligence and 
evidence against terrorist networks, and disrupt or delay imminent attacks. In November 
2016, French authorities used pre-charge powers against five men with ties to the Islamic 
State who were organizing multiple attacks across Paris.471 Also, in February 2017, three 
terror suspects were held under detention orders for an extended period after plotting to 
attack the Eiffel Tower.472 One of the suspects arrested was a sixteen-year-old girl who 
reportedly pledged loyalty to the Islamic State and allegedly attempted to travel to 
Syria.473 
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One of the eighty measures within PART calls for the use and sharing of 
European passenger name record. PNRs capture personally identifiable information, 
travel itineraries, payment information, and Advance Passenger Information System 
metrics.474 Recent terrorist attacks in France and Belgium compelled Parliament to adopt 
the measure in order to add extra layers of security. Prior reluctance to share European 
PNRs stemmed, in part, from criticism of the American no-fly list.475 In 2016, the EU 
passed a measure that facilitates the sharing of PNR with member nations as well as the 
United States, Canada, and Australia for the “prevention and detection of terrorist 
offenses and serious forms of crime.”476 
3. Combat: House Arrest, Travel Bans, Citizenship Revocation, and 
Other Measures 
The Combat element incorporates PART’s second and third priority areas, 
utilizing measures such as house arrest, travel bans, citizenship revocation, and traditional 
investigative, arrest, and prosecution. One of France’s responses to foreign terrorist 
fighters returning from the Islamic State has been to arrest them; another has been to 
place them under house arrest if there is insufficient evidence to charge them with a 
crime.477 House arrest is also an alternative to pre-trial detention.478 Following the 
terrorist attacks in Paris, 382 people were placed under house arrest as a result of state-of-
emergency statutes.479 In 2016, expansion of the state of emergency laws “[allowed] the 
government to put someone returning from a ‘Terrorist theatre of Operation’ under house 
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arrest for up to a month.”480 However, two months after the Nice attacks, the state of 
emergency was extended again, and the period of house arrest was increased to three 
months.481 Individuals under house arrest are restricted to geographical zones, must 
remain at their residence for half of the day, and are required to check-in at a police 
station a minimum of three times a day.482  
In 2014, France instituted bans on outbound and inbound travel to Syria and Iraq 
for six months, with the option of extending the ban for up to two years.483 Also known 
as “administrative interdiction to leave the territory,” this approach is a proactive one 
designed to stem the flow of foreign fighters.484 Partnering with other EU countries such 
as Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, France’s restriction allows officials to 
seize passports of aspiring foreign fighters, and prevents returnees from proliferating 
terrorism upon their return.485 However, officials noted that the ban does little to restrict 
these individuals from traveling freely through the Schengen zone.486 From November 
2014 to April 2016, out of the 308 individuals banned from travel, six violated the 
measures.487 
Article 21-27 French Civil Code states, “No one may acquire the French 
nationality or be reinstated in that nationality if he has been sentenced either for ordinary 
or serious offences that constitute a violation of the fundamental interests of the nation or 
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an act of terrorism.”488 Article 25, titled “Forfeiture of French Nationality,” allows 
authorities to revoke citizenship of current naturalized French citizens convicted of 
terrorism, as long as the revocation does not render the individual stateless.489 In 2016, 
an effort to expand the deprivation to French-born dual nationals was unpopular and was 
ultimately dropped.490 A controversial measure not just in France, citizenship deprivation 
was used as early as 2006 to expel “hate preachers” and “radical nationals.”491 From 
1996 to 2016, the French government had used this measure in thirteen instances related 
to terrorism.492 
Terrorism is prosecuted as a crime in France. Article 421-1 of the Penal Code 
outlines the majority of the terrorism statutes, which have been in place since 1986 or 
earlier. Attacks in London, Madrid, Paris, and Brussels have had an impact on the legal 
and administrative responses to terrorism. Traditional investigative, arrest, and 
prosecutorial techniques were all enhanced when the state of emergency was enacted 
following the Paris attacks in 2015. At the time of this writing, France remains in a state 
of emergency, having renewed the status multiple times. 
Before the Paris attacks, France passed legislation to curb the flow of foreign 
fighters. Act 2012-1432 was specifically designed to combat the threat of RFFs and 
terrorist camp attendees. It includes provisions for “terrorist acts committed in other 
countries by French nationals or persons habitually residing in France.”493 Other 
measures, such as “S” files and “white notes,” help officials obtain enough intelligence to 
justify some of PART’s punitive measures.  
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French authorities have used State Security or “S” files since 1969.494 Equivalent 
to a “warning notice,” criminals, terrorists, and even political activists have had an “S” 
file.495 Those who have become radicalized and are a “potential threat to national 
security” have also found themselves on the list.496 According to the International Center 
for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), composing white notes (notes blanches) is an 
administrative measure comprising “very succinct, unsigned, and undated documents 
drafted by French Intelligence Services, attesting—without fully disclosing why—that an 
individual poses a public threat to order and security.”497 White notes were criticized as 
“sometimes vague, laconic or subjective, and sometimes contain factual errors,” in a 
2016 “Statement of Opinion on the State of Emergency.”498 
4. Protect and React 
The Protect and React elements anchor the PART strategy and provide measures 
to strengthen France’s infrastructure and critical sites while ensuring resiliency after an 
attack. France’s military, as well as its cyber and transportation sectors, plays a role in 
protecting the country; the government has also engaged with citizens, private industry, 
and local municipalities to strengthen its response to acts of terrorism.499 
 YOUTH-SPECIFIC POLICIES 
1. Youth Deradicalization Program 
The ICCT estimates that there was a small contingent of French foreign fighter 
youths (approximately ten) remaining in Iraq or Syria as of late 2015.500 Further, they 
estimate there were approximately eighty-five scattered among jihadist networks in the 
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same region. In early 2017, then-French President Francois Hollande commented on the 
plight of the children of French RFFs. He stated, “We are preparing for these returns and 
the very particular processing of these children.”501 This pledge makes reference to the 
government-sponsored youth deradicalization program, which was designed to counter 
extremist ideology developing in France’s youth population. It was also found to be 
adaptable to the children returning from the Islamic State. Using similar treatment 
interventions as those used for “at-risk youth addicts,” the first youth program was 
established in 2014.502 The French government hired the Centre for Prevention of 
Sectarian Drift Linked to Islam (CPSDI) to conduct research and development and train 
local police on counter-extremism narratives.503 The head of CPSDI, Dounia Bouzar, 
also known as “Madame De-indoctrination” or “Madame Deradicalisation”, applied her 
conceptual theory of radicalization, called “relational and ideological indoctrination,” to 
treat children.504 Skeptics criticized Bouzar’s psychology-based treatment plan and she 
eventually broke away from the government.  
The voluntary deradicalization centers France opened in 2016 were supposed to 
take the place of Bouzar’s outpatient program.505 Even though the centers are geared 
toward the adult population, individuals as young as eighteen can be admitted. Bouzar 
expressed caution about youth detention centers, stating, “Putting these young people 
together is a mistake, because the propaganda of radicalism is an exaltation of the 
group.”506 
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2. Juvenile Law 
France’s juvenile justice system uses age ranges to classify juvenile offences. In 
France, criminal liability begins at eighteen years old.507 For those under ten years old, 
“no penalties can be imposed”; from ten to thirteen, “educational penalties can be taken”; 
from thirteen to sixteen, “minors may be sentenced”; and from sixteen to eighteen, 
“minors can be remanded in custody.”508 Also, beginning at sixteen, the government can 
hold youth in pre-trial detention for up to three years.509 In the first three months of 2017, 
five teenage girls, ranging in ages from fourteen to eighteen, were arrested in two 
separate incidents on terrorism charges with a nexus to the Islamic State.510 
 POLICY SPECTRUM EVALUATION: FRANCE 
Figure 5 shows how France’s PART strategy and its policy actions overall are 
evaluated on the hard-to-soft policy spectrum. It also classifies and plots France’s 
policies into primary and secondary strategic elements. 
                                                 
507 E. Aguilera, The French Legal System (Paris: Ministry of Justice, 2012), 11, 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/french_legal_system.pdf. 
508 Aguilera, 12–13. 
509 Human Rights Watch, “France: Prolonged Emergency State.” 
510 RFI, “French Terror Suspects’”; Holly Christodoulou, “Four Teenage Girls Have Been Held in 





Figure 5.  Policy Spectrum: France’s Action Plan against Radicalization and 
Terrorism (PART) Strategy 
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 CASE STUDY CONCLUSION 
The United States lacks an all-encompassing strategic counterterrorism policy on 
par with BRAT, CONTEST or PART. However, that is not to say that U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts are deficient. Although there is much to learn from other 
countries by studying how they deal not only with terrorism but also RFFs, we should be 
cautious not to supplant current policies just because others offer a new or different 
approach. What may work for Canada, the United Kingdom, or even France may not 
necessarily work in the United States. Differences in governance, culture, mentality, and 
threat should all come into play when assessing the effectiveness of current policies or 
exploring novel concepts. After researching Europe’s terrorism problems, Jeremy 
Shapiro suggests, “There are no silver bullets in the experiences of other countries.”511 
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States use a combination of 
administrative and criminal measures to address the foreign fighter phenomenon. 
Although the United States does not have a convenient framework for its 
counterterrorism strategy, many of its hard and soft measures are similar to those used by 
the three countries examined herein. The United States relies heavily upon border 
strategies, criminal justice measures, and military action to combat terrorism. Although 
the United States has attempted to integrate community outreach initiatives and counter-
narrative programs, when plotted on a spectrum, U.S. counterterrorism policies are more 
red than green.  
When it comes to countering the threat from foreign fighter youth, few countries 
have embraced youth-specific counterterrorism policies. Instead, they rely on a 
conglomeration of juvenile criminal justice laws, counterterrorism measures geared 
toward adults, and experimentation in deradicalization programs. Policymakers should 
ask themselves if this is sufficient or whether more can be done. In the past, the issue of 
children who have engaged in armed conflict has been primarily a humanitarian concern 
and not a criminal matter. However, the subjugation of children by the Islamic State is 
tipping the scales in favor of the latter. 
                                                 
511 Shapiro, “Detention of Terrorism Suspects.” 
 118 
Some argue that relying on more hard than soft policies to address the foreign 
terrorist fighter issue is “treating the symptom, not the cause.”512 Yet countries with and 
without strategic counterterrorism policies have pegged the needle in the red of the policy 
spectrum, resulting in more RFFs being imprisoned than deradicalized. While this has 
short-term benefits, the long-term dangers may not have manifested yet. In some cases in 
the United States, terrorism charges related to activities supporting the Islamic State have 
yielded defendants anywhere from thirty-five years imprisonment to less than two 
years.513 There is little data on the terrorist recidivism rate, or on the effectiveness of 
prison deradicalization programs. However, there is historical data on how imprisonment 
can exacerbate extremist ideology in at-risk populations.514 The charge of crafting a 
strategic counterterrorism policy that incorporates all seen and unforeseen implications is 
difficult at best and impossible at worst. 
Figure 6 shows where Canada, the United Kingdom, and France’s policy 
actions—as well as their youth-specific policy actions—fall on the hard-to-soft policy 
spectrum. Figure 7 indicates the policy elements of the countries’ strategies as primary, 
secondary, or nonexistent. Figure 8 shows a comparative evaluation of these elements for 
the countries’ youth-specific policies. 
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Figure 6.  Policy Spectrum Comparison 
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Figure 7.  Policy Action Element Occurrence Comparison 
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Figure 8.  Youth-Specific Policy Action Element Occurrence Comparison 
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VII. SAFE AT HOME 
Ultimately, the foreign fighter issue represents not only an immediate-term 




The research contained in this thesis began with the question: What are the 
domestic security ramifications of the youth terrorist fighters indoctrinated by the Islamic 
State? To narrow the scope to a manageable level, this work concentrated on the Islamic 
State’s returning foreign fighters and the future danger they pose to the United States. 
This task was difficult because analysts do not predict the future, nor was it apparent at 
the onset whether Islamic State youths had a clear path to the United States.  
Pivotal to this research was the information gleaned about the Islamic State’s 
involvement in the 2015 Paris attacks. Before these attacks, and as the Islamic State 
gained notoriety, analysts saw an unprecedented influx of foreign fighters flow into the 
region. Soon, the number of foreign terrorist fighters fighting on behalf of the Islamic 
State surpassed the numbers of all other foreign conflicts to date. As these figures 
proliferated, there was a growing concern among governments that, one day, these 
fighters would return to their homelands and bring with them all of the training, 
experience, and knowledge that they had gained while engaged in operations abroad.  
The speculation of some experts became a reality after it was revealed that most 
of the perpetrators of the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks were French and Belgian 
nationals who had traveled to the Islamic State to wage jihad in the name of the 
proclaimed “caliphate.” The RFF issue had, indeed, manifested in civilian casualties in 
Europe.  
Europe has a burgeoning security problem because of the number of foreign 
fighters that might return home and carry out attacks. Intelligence agencies in Europe 
were concerned that the sheer numbers of fighters flowing back into the continent would 
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outmatch their ability to track and neutralize the threats. This argument is based on the 
simple concept of number parity, in which a deficit of counterterrorism operatives results 
in gaps in coverage, thus increasing the danger. 
Compared Europe, the United States has had fewer foreign fighters make it to the 
Islamic State, mostly because many of them were stopped during their outbound travel. 
There is less concern in the United States than in Europe that the number of returnees 
would overwhelm the country’s capacity to track and hunt them. For instance, by the end 
of 2015, the United States had between 150 to 250 fighters make it to the region and only 
forty confirmed returnees.515 While this number is not high, the domestic threat from 
RFFs may not lie solely in the American RFF population.  
Although the actual number of American RFFs may be lower than the number in 
Western Europe, aggregated foreign fighter totals do not give us an accurate picture of 
the foreign fighter domestic threat; relying solely on the number of foreign fighters to 
gauge the severity of the foreign fighter threat is deceiving. Although it may be true that a 
large contingent of RFFs strain the capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, this fact alone is not enough to make a correlation between numbers and 
danger. In essence, a direct relationship between numbers and threat (i.e., the higher the 
number of RFFs, the greater threat) does not exist since other factors—such as U.S. 
visitor and immigration policies—provide avenues for transnational RFFs to find their 
way into the United States.  
Research into the methods of the Paris attackers revealed that the group was not a 
loose band of acquaintances, but rather a well-organized cell, determined to launch 
attacks on the West in the name of the Islamic State. Armed with the skills they obtained 
in the terrorist training camps, they were able to discretely travel back to Europe, 
unencumbered, across the Schengen Area. They used forged passports and broken travel 
to evade authorities, and they sought refuge in Muslim community enclaves in the 
outskirts of major cities. The collective disaffection felt by the residents of these 
                                                 
515 Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters Update,” 10. 
 125 
communities helped shelter the operatives from the authorities, while loose border 
controls allowed the terrorists to travel from country to country.  
Twenty-five out of the twenty-six Schengen countries are U.S. Visa Waiver 
Program participants, which grants their citizens visa-free travel to the United States.516 
Perceived as a security gap by some experts, Congress made improvements to the 
program in 2016. However, the United States was not the only country in North America 
to have individuals travel to the Islamic State. Canada also had terrorist travelers who 
have since returned to our neighbors to the north. With the longest shared border area 
between two countries in the world, the United States and Canada have a vested interest 
in working together to secure their external and internal border crossings from RFFs. The 
view that the United States has minimal domestic exposure to RFFs is misconceived.517 
The United States is not insulated from the RFFs of Europe or other countries, and the 
extent of the threat from the returnees has not been realized.  
The design of this study revolved around the answer to the following question: 
How could a child soldier of the Islamic State carry out a terrorist attack in the United 
States? I set out to answer this question by relying on traditional criminal investigative 
techniques. Motive, means, and opportunity are three elements that can provide an 
investigator with the insight he or she needs to solve a case. In the same way, these three 
elements can be used to evaluate the reasonableness of a threat. Assuming that the 
children of the Islamic State have the motive and means (i.e., skills) to attack the United 
States, their opportunity to do so is less clear. Understanding that many of the local 
children fighting for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq may not have the opportunity to 
travel to America, my focus shifted to the foreign fighters in the region. Conventional 
wisdom states that there are three possible outcomes for Islamic State foreign fighters: 
(1) remain in the region and fight, (2) travel to other conflicts and become “jihad 
tourists,” and (3) return home. I assessed it was the returnees that would have the greatest 
opportunity to attack the United States domestically. For this reason, it was necessary to 
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bundle the threat from the child soldiers of the Islamic State into the larger RFF 
phenomenon. Lumping RFFs of all ages together, provides an overarching view of the 
threat space. For example, the concepts of the veteran effect and lag time do not 
correspond to one demographic of RFFs. Rather, the elements that make them 
noteworthy (i.e., training, experience, knowledge, and the ability to lie in wait) can be 
found in the youth returnees as well. These adult concepts are not a byproduct of age, but 
rather of socialization and indoctrination. Thus, they can be applied to the child soldiers 
of the Islamic State as well as to the youth combatants engaged in conflict around the 
world. Demonstrating that the RFF phenomenon is age agnostic helps explain how 
children fighting in Iraq and Syria in the name of the Islamic State have pathways to the 
United States. Whether as children of RFFs or as young foreign fighters themselves, there 
is a contingent of young Islamic State insurgents that have the motive, means, and 
opportunity to conduct terrorist operations on U.S. soil. As the Islamic States loses its 
foothold in the region, it is likely that more foreign fighters, many of them youths, may 
return. The following discussion explores how this is possible and the implications 
should it occur. 
 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Three major findings of this study suggest we should be concerned with RFFs and 
their children.  
(1) Finding 1: Avenues exist for youth fighters indoctrinated and socialized 
by the Islamic State to plan, conduct, and execute terrorist operations in 
the United States. 
Both physical and theoretical routes exist through which young fighters of the 
Islamic State can organize and carry out terrorist attacks domestically. Physical paths can 
be probed, exploited, and manipulated to shuttle known and unknown Islamic State 
operatives past domestic intelligence services and border protection agencies. On the 
other hand, we can construct an imaginative scenario in which the Islamic State sends its 
child soldiers back to their original homelands to lie in wait as sleeper agents, only to 
conduct a terrorist attack when least expected. While some view this idea as fanciful, 
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there is evidence that the Islamic State is already planning this action by creating an 
external operations branch called the Emni.518 The mastermind behind the Paris attack, 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was purported to be a member of this vanguard.519 Also, Islamic 
State European foreign fighter operatives are not the only ones that have evaded border-
crossing detection. Moner Mohammad Abusalha, a U.S. citizen, was able to travel to the 
Islamic State, travel back to the United States, and then return to the Islamic State to 
carry out a suicide attack—all unbeknownst to U.S. law enforcement agencies.520  
The domestic threat to the United States from RFFs can come from terrorist cells 
or a lone individual, and it can originate from the sea, air, or land. While much of the 
Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2015 concentrated 
on the RFFs coming to the United States from overseas by air, the porosity of the 
northern and southern U.S. borders continues to be a challenge for law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.521 Terrorists have used the border crossings to infiltrate the United 
States in attempts to carry out attacks. Although the number of Islamic State RFFs in 
Canada is small, and non-existent in Mexico, it is not the presence of battle-hardened 
veterans of the insurgency in these countries that is the most worrisome. Rather, it is the 
existence of established routes of entry that smugglers and undocumented aliens use to 
bypass authorities.  
As stated previously, it is conceivable that youth Islamic State RFFs or even 
“cubs of the caliphate” could leave Iraq and Syria without their parents or guardians. 
Unaccompanied minors arriving in the United States receive special protections under the 
law and may qualify for immigration relief. According to the American Immigration 
Council, some of these protections include:  
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• Asylum: Asylum is a form of international protection granted to refugees 
who are present in the United States. In order to qualify for asylum, a 
person must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on one 
of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group. 
• Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS): SIJS is a humanitarian form 
of relief available to noncitizen minors who were abused, neglected, or 
abandoned by one or both parents. To be eligible for SIJS, a child must be 
under 21, unmarried, and the subject of certain dependency orders issued 
by a juvenile court. 
• U visas: A U visa is available to victims of certain crimes. To be eligible, 
the person must have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse and 
have cooperated with law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution 
of the crime. 
• T visas: A T visa is available to individuals who have been victims of a 
severe form of trafficking. To be eligible, the person must demonstrate 
that he or she would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual or severe 
harm if removed from the United States.522 
From fiscal year 2013 through 2014, Customs and Border Patrol agents 
encountered over 100,000 unaccompanied migrant children.523 In fiscal year 2014, they 
detained over 67,000.524 This was two to three times the total from previous years. From 
October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014, Customs and Border Patrol apprehended over 
18,000 unaccompanied children from Honduras, almost 17,000 from Guatemala, and 
close to 16,000 from Mexico and El Salvador each.525 These numbers represent the 
height of the unaccompanied minor surge; 2015 totals approached 20,000.526 The 
American Immigration Council claims one of the reasons that many of these children flee 
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Central America is the violence from its cartels, criminal syndicates, and gangs.527 This 
is no different from those fleeing from the region where the Islamic State has had a 
stronghold. The fear among many is that Islamic State terrorists could hide themselves 
among refugees or asylum seekers and enter the United States through legal immigration 
procedures.  
In 2016, the Cato Institute conducted a risk assessment that analyzed terrorism 
and immigration. They found that from 1975 through the end of 2015, 3,024 people were 
killed by foreign-born terrorists in the United States.528 The data shows that “ten of them 
were illegal immigrants, 54 were lawful permanent residents (LPR), 19 were students, 1 
entered on a K-1 fiancé(e) visa, 20 were refugees, 4 were asylum seekers, 34 were 
tourists on various visas, and 3 were from Visa Waiver Program  countries. The visas for 
9 terrorists could not be determined.”529 After the Paris attacks in 2015, the U.S. Visa 
Waiver Program was thought to be a gap that could allow terrorists to come into the 
country with little vetting. In response, Congress enacted enhancements to the program, 
and there is an argument that can be made that it is as rigorous, if not more so, than the 
regular visa vetting process. Similarly, the refugee process has come under attack by 
some who claim it does not do enough to screen the refugees from countries that harbor 
terrorist groups. However, the multi-year process has many phases in which the 
applicants are continually screened and vetted.530  
I assess that the asylum process is the most vulnerable immigration procedure that 
could lead to the entry of unaccompanied minors of the Islamic State into the United 
States. Although historical data from the Cato Institute reflects that 0.0006 percent of the 
population seeking asylum from 1975 through 2015 turned out to be terrorists, these 
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individuals were involved in some of the most notorious terrorist attacks.531 The 
Tsarnaev brothers and Ramzi Yousef were among the asylum seekers who perpetrated 
attacks on U.S. soil.532 My analysis does not assume that every Islamic State child 
entering the United States and claiming asylum will end up conducting a terrorist attack. I 
simply propose that the asylum process is the easiest way for them to enter the United 
States.  
Using routes established by human traffickers and the legal protections of 
immigration law, the youths from the Islamic State have a path to the United States. 
Three main types of children could travel to the United States as unaccompanied minors 
from territory once controlled by the Islamic State.  
• Innocents—These are not Islamic State child soldiers, but rather children 
of Iraq and Syria who are fleeing the violence in the region and are 
seeking refugee status or a legitimate claim of asylum in the United States. 
• “Terror Tots”533—These are child soldiers of the Islamic State who are 
attempting to infiltrate the United States to conduct a terrorist attack on 
behalf of the Islamic State.  
• War Children—These are former child soldiers of the Islamic State who 
have been socialized, indoctrinated, and trained by the Islamic State, and 
who are fleeing violence in the hope of a new life.  
It is the terror tots and the war children who are of most concern. For reasons 
outlined previously in this work, there is little reason to doubt that if terror tots were to 
enter the country, they could and would perpetrate an attack. It is in the war children that 
more ambiguity rests. Although we have yet to see an Islamic State war child conduct a 
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domestic attack, the question remains: Are these children dangerous? The risk these 
children pose is not nonexistent, but we cannot yet say how dangerous they are.  
(2) Finding 2: Youth fighters of the Islamic State share similarities with the 
child soldiers of other armed groups that influence whether or not they 
will have the propensity to engage in future terrorist attacks. 
The Islamic State’s recruitment, use, and exploitation of children is similar to the 
methods employed by many other groups that send youths into battle. Also, the violence 
and traumatic events that the children experience while engaged with these factions are 
similar across the globe. While the circumstances and motivations that lead organizations 
to use and recruit children may be different, the child soldier situation in the Islamic State 
bears the same hallmarks as other notorious syndicates such as the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, the Revolutionary United Front, and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, to 
name a few. However, it is not the similarities or disparities among the strategies and 
tactics of these groups that is the most interesting. The manner in which children are 
recruited and used does not necessarily provide us with insight as to how violent these 
children will be years from now. While much research has been conducted on the 
physical and emotional traumatic effects of war on children, it is the intangible and 
inherent qualities of children that may provide us with the most foresight into their future 
propensity for violence.  
Jo Boyden and Joanna de Barry point out that assessments on war-affected youths 
follow one or more of the six commonly used research plans: (1) a biomedical 
framework, (2) medical investigations, (3) psychiatric assessments, (4) historical 
analyses, (5) “cultural specificity of biomedicine,” and (6) biological and psychological 
child development processes.534 They claim, “Despite some advances, scholarship has 
yet to capture the true magnitude, nature or effects of such experiences.”535 In a quest to 
fill the knowledge gap, Boyden and de Barry focus on the stories and first-hand accounts 
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of children, using “anthropological theory and ethnographic methods.”536 Their research 
was longitudinal and covered countries in Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and 
Europe. They found: 
The collection warns us, first and foremost, against simplistic assumptions 
about children’s reactions to conflict, suggesting that while it is difficult to 
exaggerate the horrors of war, it is quite possible to overuse such concepts 
such as trauma. Young people’s responses to war are revealed as 
multifaceted and nuanced; age is not necessarily the critical determinant of 
vulnerability, and even when profoundly distressed or troubled, the young 
frequently exercise remarkable resilience.537  
Children’s resiliency is a concept echoed by Stark and Wessells. They argue that 
embracing a “resiliency paradigm” instead of a “deficits approach” is important because 
it “emphasizes the importance of building on the existing strengths of the children, 
families and communities. A resilience paradigm also points the way toward a different 
way of thinking which is based on strengthening empowerment, young people’s agency 
and voice, and collective action to support children’s reintegration.”538 
There is nothing that proves the children of the Islamic State are not as resilient as 
the children studied by Bowden, de Barry, Stark, and Wessells. Bowden and de Barry 
caution that context is one of the most important factors that influences individual 
responses to war.539 For this reason, they focus on the “material, social structure and 
ideational creations that frame young people’s adversity.”540 Stark and Wessells claim 
that “reintegration is supported by five key elements—psychosocial interventions, 
cultural and spiritual practices, education, livelihoods, and family community 
mobilization and reconciliation.”541 If we use a similar approach to explore the 
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complexity of the child soldier situation in the Islamic State, we begin to see challenges 
on the horizon. 
Although there are barriers to resiliency for the children of the Islamic State, 
removing them from the conflict zone and keeping them out should be the primary focus 
of any nation concerned with the threat from Islamic State child soldiers. It is important 
to remember that the conflict they need to be removed from is not only the physical 
battles being waged in Syria and Iraq, but also the ideological conflict of violent jihad. 
Just as refugee camps have the potential to draw children back into violence, so does 
placing Islamic State RFF youths into environments in the United States that foster 
radicalization. These settings can be found in religious institutions, at school, among 
friends, at home, and in jail. This has implications for U.S. policies that promote 
imprisonment of foreign fighter juveniles upon their return.  
(3) Finding 3: U.S. policies are geared toward addressing the humanitarian 
crisis that emerges out of the use of child soldiers, yet we treat the child 
soldiers of terrorist organizations like criminals.  
If we use hard-to-soft spectrum to assess U.S. counterterrorism policies, we see 
that punitive policies outweigh social programs. Arrest, prosecution, deportation, and 
imprisonment are common outcomes for terrorism suspects. This is true especially in 
response to the foreign fighter phenomenon, in which most of the individuals 
apprehended by the United States face long terms of incarceration. Even when minors are 
arrested on suspicions of terrorism, they end up in the juvenile criminal justice system or, 
in some cases, imprisoned as adults. Michael Wessells calls this “retributive justice,” 
wherein “a retributive model of justice seeks to hold wrongdoers accountable for their 
crimes through punishment, the severity of which is proportional to the seriousness of 
their crimes.”542 He cautions that applying this approach to child soldiers creates many 
problems. For instance, he cites the arduous task of delineating the ambiguous line that 
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exists between victims and perpetrators.543 Also, he claims that a retributive model can 
have an inverse effect “where retribution can fuel ongoing cycles of violence.”544 
The issue of child soldiers is viewed by the international community as a 
humanitarian crisis. In the United States, the Child Soldier Accountability Act was 
established to punish countries and individuals responsible for the recruitment and use of 
children in conflicts.545 The intent and verbiage of the law reflect that the United States 
views the child soldier issue through a humanitarian crisis lens. At the outset of this 
thesis, I argued that not only is the Islamic State child soldier dilemma a humanitarian 
problem, but it is also a national security issue. Further, I believe that if the United States 
only recognized the problem of child soldiers as a humanitarian crisis and failed to 
understand the domestic threat from the child soldiers of the Islamic State, then we would 
be ignoring an entire population of potential terrorists. 
The Islamic States’ socialization and indoctrination of a younger generation of 
fighters has consequences for the U.S. counterterrorism mission. I have demonstrated 
how the children of RFFs could enter the United States and that they have the training, 
experience, and knowledge to carry out attacks just as their older contemporaries do. 
However, I have found that there are more mechanisms in place for the United States to 
treat Islamic State RFF youths as criminal terrorists than as victims of a humanitarian 
crisis. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom of how countries should handle war-
affected children and even contradicts U.S. policies. This is important because research 
shows that, in some instances, prison nurtures the radicalization process. Here is an 
example of how prison radicalization happens: 
When sharing a tiny cell with two or three others, the weaker cellmates are 
clearly at risk of being indoctrinated by stronger ones. An extremist 
agenda can advance quickly as a result of the isolation, boredom and anger 
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that a young man feels in jail; a captive Muslim population clearly 
presents opportunities to the would-be radicaliser.546 
Evidence shows that U.S. military prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan—such as 
where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was imprisoned—have become incubators for terrorists.547 
Most notably, France has garnered the attention of the international media for the surge in 
radicalization emanating from its prison population. The examples of former French 
prisoners turned jihadi terrorists are hard to ignore. Mohammed Mehra (2012 rabbi 
shooting spree), Mehdi Nemmouche (2014 Brussels Jewish Museum attack), and Cherif 
Kouchi and Amedy Coulibaly (two of the 2015 Paris attackers), all spent time in French 
prisons as young men.548  
In an alternate approach to traditional incarceration techniques, multiple prisons 
throughout France have dedicated units designed to house some “violent or potentially 
violent extremists.”549 According to a report released in 2016, dedicated units were 
created for “the avoidance of pressures and the spread of Radical religious proselytism 
and, on the other hand, to promote the care of Radicalized.”550 The Le Contrôleur général 
des lieux de privation de liberté, a French independent authority that watches over 
institutions of detention, concluded in 2015, “The phenomenon of radicalisation is not 
recent and has not been sufficiently taken into account by the authorities. Moreover, the 
Contrôleur général observed that prison overcrowding feeds proselytism and favours the 
influence of radical detainees over the more fragile detainees.”551 
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In Minnesota, the United States is testing the waters with programs at the federal 
level for defendants convicted of terrorism charges. U.S. District Judge Michael Davis is 
spearheading the initiative and has recruited Daniel Koehler, the director of the German 
Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, to coordinate the 
assessments.552 The purpose of the program is “to try to reintegrate terrorism defendants 
into society when they are deemed eligible to be released back into U.S. communities by 
federal judges.”553 The program’s first subjects are four individuals from the Islamic 
State who pleaded guilty to providing material support to the organization.554 However, 
like other schemes, the efficacy of the program is in question. Koehler states, “There’s no 
100 percent guarantee that these intervention methods actually work.…But I think it’s 
better than working blindfolded without any kind of assessment or structure or 
protocol.”555 It is important to note that this is one program in one U.S. district court, and 
not a larger effort on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. government to 
employ soft measures to address the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of suspected 
terrorists.   
In essence, it is not a matter of whether hard or soft policies work. While some 
RFFs will be more receptive to hard policies, there will be instances in which punitive 
measures drive them into the hands of radicalizers. Likewise, soft policies may not work 
on some, as the most hardened and devout soldiers will take advantage of the system in 
the hopes that cooperation or faking a cure will win them their freedom. It is more about 
having options. A menu of hard, soft, and everything-in-between policies will ensure that 
each child can be evaluated according to his or her individual barriers to resiliency and 
will be placed into the appropriate channel. Currently, the United States lacks this 
diversity among its counterterrorism policy spectrum. 
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APPENDIX 
Data from a 2016 International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) report were 
compiled and analyzed in Table 3 to determine which of the three European nations (the 
United Kingdom, Germany, or Belgium) faced the greatest potential for exposure to 
young RFFs. In this analysis, exposure is synonymous to foreign fighter (FF) volume 
based on four variables: total number of FFs (FFt), returned FFs (FFr), FFs remaining 
abroad (FFa), and FF average age (FFage). A weighted ranking assigned the following 
importance to the variables: Returned FFs (35 percent), Remaining Abroad FFs 
(35 percent), Total FFs (20 percent), and Age (10 percent). Returned FFs and Remaining 
Abroad FFs were given the most weight because they represent the actual and potential 
number of returning foreign fighters. Total FFs were assigned the next highest value, as 
they represent the total pool of fighters. Total FFs were not given the same weight as 
RFFs since it is understood that some FFs abroad will be killed or will not return. Finally, 
Age was given the least amount of weight because this unit of measurement varies across 
countries and the values from the ICCT report were both abstract and precise. For 
example, the age range of FFs from the United Kingdom is estimated from eighteen to 
thirty years old, whereas the age range of FFs in Belgium is calculated to 25.7.  
The variables were ranked from 1 to 3, where 1 is the leading variable in the 
category. Except for the Age variable, a direct relationship exists in variable importance, 
where a higher number of fighters represents a greater importance. For this research, an 
inverse relationship exists and younger FFs were ranked of more importance than older 
FFs. Finally, the lowest weighted score represents the country with the most potential to 
be exposed to young RFFs. 
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Table 3.   European Nations with the Greatest Potential Exposure to 
Young Islamic State RFFs556 
 Weight UK Rank Germany Rank2 Belgium Rank3 
Total FFs (FFt) 20% 700–760 2 720–760 1 420–516 3 
Returned FFs 
(FFr) 
35% >350 1 250 2 55–130 3 
Remaining 
Abroad FFs (FFa) 
35% 315 1 238 2 180–260 3 
Age: (FFage) 10% 18–30 1 <30 (5%) 3 25.7 (14–
16) 
2 
Weighted Scores 100%  1.2  1.9  2.9 
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